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One of the perplexing phenomena in the rise of judicial power in 
democracies worldwide is the high level of public support given in many 
countries to these essentially counter-majoritarian institutions. Israel has 
served for many years as “Exhibit A” in accounts of the rise of judicial 
power. Yet, following decades of strong public support for the Israeli 
Supreme Court, there has been a sharp decline since the beginning of 
this century. Based on an empirical study of television coverage of the 
Israeli Supreme Court on Channel One evening news broadcasts 
between 1993 and 1996, I examine a neglected factor in the attempts to 
explain this decline: the changing media coverage of the Court. I show 
that the entrance of a second, commercial television channel (Channel 
Two) in 1993 had a profound impact on the way the Court was depicted. 
Using both quantitative and qualitative data, I argue that, because of 
patterns of coverage dictated by the needs of commercial media, the 
Court’s long-standing mythical image started to crumble in 1993. 
Contrary to prevalent claims that attribute the change in the Court’s 
public image solely to developments in its jurisprudence, I show that a 
shift in the medium covering the Court is partly responsible for the shift 
in the Court’s public image. With the entrance of infotainment, rather 
than continuing to present the Court as an institution that decides cases 
based on legal expertise, television framed the Court more and more as 
an institution that decides cases based on ideology and even on partisan 
politics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, Aharon Barak, the former president of the Israeli Supreme 
Court (the Court), was perplexed. Since 2000, public opinion polls 
showed a continuing and sharp decline in public confidence in the 
Court,2 yet Barak could not understand the public’s growing dismay with 
the Court. He confessed: “I am aware that according to our rating, the 
public support of courts is declining and I ask myself why? I do not think 
  
 2. See Or Bassok, Television Coverage of the Israeli Supreme Court 1968-1992: 
The Persistence of the Mythical Image, 42(1) ISR. L. REV. 306, 307 (2009) (surveying 
public opinion polls data on the decline in public confidence for the Court); ASSAF 
MEYDANI, THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION 9, 113 
(2011); ARYE RATTNER, LEGAL CULTURE: LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE EYES OF 
THE ISRAELI PUBLIC 2000-2009, 50-52 (2009) (Isr.) (presenting data demonstrating the 
decline in public support for the Court between the years 2000 and 2007). 
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that in recent years we have become worse.”3 This Article offers an 
answer to Barak’s perplexity. I agree with Barak that the decline in 
public support for the Court at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
cannot be explained solely by a change in the Court’s adjudication. The 
sharp decline in the Court’s public support occurred more than fifteen 
years after the revolution in the Court’s adjudication began.4 Moreover, 
even the Court’s critics argue that its activism had declined by the end of 
the 1990s.5 Indeed, as Barak stated, the Court did not become “worse” in 
the years preceding his statement. In this Article, I suggest that only after 
the media responsible for constructing the Court’s image in the public 
mind went through a dramatic shift, could a change in public confidence 
in the Court occur. In the following sections, I depict the change in the 
Court’s portrayal in television coverage. Based on this depiction, I argue 
that a shift in the medium presenting the Court to the public, a shift that 
occurred following the inception of the commercial television channel 
(“Channel Two”), had a great impact on the change in the portrayal of 
the Court. 
In a previous Article, I showed that, up until 1993, television 
continued to adhere to a mythical perspective in covering the Court, 
presenting the Court, by and large, as an institution guided solely by 
legal expertise. The Court’s growing involvement in public life and in 
the political arena, occurring during the 1980s, was not sufficient to 
erode the Court’s mythical image. The Court’s strong public support 
  
 3. Rona Tal, Aharon Barak: Do not Allow the Knesset the Last Word, YNET, 
Nov. 21, 2007 (Isr.). 
 4. See Menachem Mautner, Law and Culture in Israel: The 1950s and the 
1980s, in THE HISTORY OF LAW IN A MULTI-CULTURAL SOCIETY: ISRAEL 1917-1967, 175 
(Ron Harris et al. eds., 2002) (summarizing his well-known theory that the 1980s were a 
revolutionary decade in the Court’s adjudication, characterized by the “decline of 
formalism and the rise of values”). 
 5. RUTH GAVISON, MORDECHAI KREMNITZER & YOAV DOTAN, JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM, FOR AND AGAINST: THE ROLE OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN ISRAELI 
SOCIETY 66-67 (2000) (“A series of judgments given during the 1990s expresses a 
different direction in the Court’s adjudication than the activism described above.”); id. at 
149 (“In recent years, one can detect a tendency of growing caution and awareness in the 
HCJ’s adjudication, that are responsible for the growing deference in its decisions.”); 
Moshe Landau, Judicial Activism, 8 H’MISPHAT 535, 538 (2002) (Isr.). 
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during these years may be explained by the media’s adherence to the 
mythical prism in its coverage of the Court.6  
This Article is the second part of an empirical project analyzing the 
coverage of the Israeli Supreme Court. In the first part, I raised a thesis 
on the influence of Channel Two’s entrance into the arena.7 In this 
Article, I substantiate it. I pick up the story at the point where I left it, 
and present the rocky years the Court went through between 1993 and 
1996. I show that the Court’s mythical image began to crumble in 
Channel One’s news television coverage as a result of changes in 
communication technology, i.e., the entrance of the commercial channel, 
rather than, as scholars argue, solely due to a shift in the Court’s 
adjudication. This Article shows that because of a change in media that 
transformed Israeli television from “a televised newspaper” to a medium 
that gives expression to television’s biases as a technology,8 the Court, 
from the mid-1990s or so, by and large, was no longer depicted through 
the mythical prism.  
After presenting the background required in order to understand the 
work of both the Court and the media during the years examined in the 
Article, I turn to present my hypothesis. In the third section, I present 
quantitative data on the coverage of the Court between 1993 and 1996 
and explain how the data support my thesis. Next, I present quantitative 
analysis of several categories of coverage that further supports my 
hypothesis on the shattering of the Court’s mythical image in media 
coverage. Yet, remnants of this dominant mythical prism remained and 
in the following section I present their manifestations. Before 
concluding, I examine several competing theories that explain the 
shattering of the Court’s mythical image without referring to a change in 
  
 6. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 356-57 (“Television’s only channel, for twenty-
five years continued to portray the Court in mythical terms. Although not focusing on the 
question of the Court’s institutional legitimacy, a study of newspapers’ coverage supports 
this conclusion.”). 
 7. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 308-09, 361. 
 8. See NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH 85 (1986) (“There are 
many places in the world where television, though the same technology as in America, is 
an entirely different medium from that which we know. I refer to those place where . . . 
only one station is available . . . .”); YORAM PERI, TELEPOPULISM 40 (2004) (“During the 
twenty years of monopolistic public service television . . . Israel, in fact still remained in 
the era of print journalism. The era of visual culture, the ‘neotelevision era,’ began with 
the commencement of broadcasting by Channel 2, the commercial channel.”). 
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the medium. In my concluding remarks, I offer some thoughts on media 
coverage of national high courts as an important factor for understanding 
public support given in many countries for the rise of judicial power. 
I. BACKGROUND  
1. The Media Coverage of the Court until 1992 
The Court had three functions during the period of this study: hearing 
appeals from district courts as a criminal appellate court; hearing appeals 
as a civil appellate court; and serving as the High Court of Justice 
(HCJ).9 In its HCJ capacity, the Court operated as a court of first and last 
instance, adjudicating thousands of petitions each year against public 
agencies exercising their legal powers.10 Since the mid-1980s the Court 
significantly relaxed the rules of standing and lowered the barriers of 
non-justiciability.11 Thus, in the period between 1993 and 1996, there 
was hardly any controversy on the Israeli public agenda that did not, 
sooner or later, reach the Supreme Court.12 
Until the inception of Channel Two in 1993, Channel One was the 
sole Israeli television channel available, and thus, it received very high 
ratings. According to opinion polls, the main news edition (“Mabat”) had 
average ratings of 70% (and some claim up to 90%) of the Israeli 
  
 9. See Yoav Dotan, Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers, and Human 
Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice during the Intifada, 33 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 319, 322-23 (1999). 
 10. In 2000 Administrative Courts were established as separate chambers of the 
District Courts. While their jurisdiction is still limited, in issues under the District Courts 
jurisdiction the Supreme Court serves as an administrative appellate division. See 
Administrative Courts Act, 2000, S.H. 190 (Isr.).  
 11. See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, The Israeli Constitutional Process: Legislative 
Ambivalence and Judicial Resolute Drive, 11 REV. CONST. STUD. 345, 370 (2006) (noting 
that the Court “expanded its jurisdiction by letting go of all requirements of standing, by 
abolishing in fact the political question doctrine”). Accord Ran Hirschl, The Socio-
Political Origins of Israel’s Juristocracy, 16 CONSTELLATIONS 476, 478-79 (2009). 
 12. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY 1, 74 (2004); Yoav Dotan, 
Judicial Accountability in Israel: The High Court of Justice and the Phenomenon of 
Judicial Hyperactivism, 8(4) ISR. AFFAIRS 87, 97 (2002) (“[T]he HCJ became a key 
player within the Israeli polity. There is hardly a political controversy, an issue of public 
importance or a contemporary moral dilemma that does not find its way, sooner rather 
than later, as the subject of a petition to this judicial forum.”). 
44 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.1  
population.13 Hence, at that period, Mabat had a crucial role in defining 
the borders of the Israeli public mind and thus was considered by many 
to be Israel’s “campfire.”14 
Although the Court had gone through a revolutionary decade during 
the 1980s, becoming deeply involved in almost every aspect of Israeli 
political life, the coverage of the Court by the sole television channel 
continued to adhere to the mythical image, as it had from the inception of 
television in Israel in 1968.15 A study of the coverage of the Court in 
newspapers also demonstrates a similar commitment to the mythical 
image during those years.16 The distinction between law and politics 
remained firm in media coverage, even though the Court shifted from a 
formalist language to a language of values and policy considerations.17 
The Court was presented as deciding on the basis of legal considerations, 
even when it intervened in the political arena.18 The mythical prism was 
so powerful that other alternatives for imagining the Court were just not 
visible in the media during that period, prior to the entrance of Channel 
Two. Thus, these alternatives were beyond the boundaries of how Israelis 
collectively imagined the Court.  
The 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was an intoxicating period 
for the Israeli Supreme Court. Contrary to scholarly predictions,19 public 
  
 13. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 319. 
 14. OZ ALMOG, FAREWELL TO ‘SRULIK’—CHANGING VALUES AMONG THE ISRAELI 
ELITE 291 (2004) (Isr.). See also, OREN SOFFER, MASS COMMUNICATION IN ISRAEL 251-53 
(2011) (Isr.). 
 15. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 357-59 (“[T]he Court acquired an increasingly 
central role in Israeli public life without significantly eroding its mythical image.”). 
 16. See Bryna Bogoch & Yifat Holzman-Gazit, Mutual Bond: Media Frames and 
the Israeli High Court of Justice, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 53, 55, 77, 79 (2008). 
 17. See MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW & CULTURE OF ISRAEL 90-95 (2011) 
(discussing the change in the Court’s discursive practices). 
 18. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 351-53 (“[T]he mythical image was so persistent 
that instead the Court’s actions were presented as apolitical, standing in direct contrast 
with the wheeling and dealing of the political arena.”). 
 19. See Alfred Witkon, The Substantive Right in Administrative Law, 9 IYUNEI 
MISHPAT 5 (1983), reprinted in JUSTICE AND THE JUDICIARY 147, 150-51, 167 (1988) 
(Isr.); GAVISON, KREMNITZER & DOTAN, supra note 5, at 65 (“At the beginning of the 
1980s, when the trend of intervention began, the senior judges of the Supreme Court (led 
by Judges Witkon and Landau) warned of over-intervention by the Court in sensitive 
matters that are subject to controversy . . . . They predicted that such intervention will 
lead . . . in the end, to a decline in its public position.”). 
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support for the Court remained well above 90%,20 even though the Court 
became more and more active and involved in the political arena. Studies 
based on public opinion polls revealed that, during that period, the 
public’s enduring support was based on the Court’s mythical image as a 
neutral, objective, and apolitical expert that reaches its decisions in 
accordance with the law.21  
2. Channel Two Enters the Arena 
The inception of Channel Two in November 1993, coupled with the 
entrance of satellite channels during the 1990s and, to a lesser extent, the 
creation of a second commercial channel (Channel 10) in January 2002, 
brought a sharp decline in the ratings of Mabat.22 Surveys conducted in 
1995 and 1996 showed that between 30% and 31% of the population 
watched Mabat.23 The “people meter” system,24 that in 1998 replaced the 
conflicting ratings data from surveys conducted by the two channels, 
showed that at the beginning of 1998, Mabat still received higher ratings 
than Channel Two’s news edition. According to this data, in July 1998 
Channel Two’s news edition not only began receiving higher ratings than 
Mabat, but also became the most watched television program for 
substantial periods.25  
  
 20. See GAD BARZILAI, EPHRAIM YUCHTMAN-YA’AR & ZEEV SEGAL, THE ISRAELI 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ISRAELI PUBLIC 76 (1994) (Isr.) (noting in 1991, 78.1% of the 
Jewish public had high trust in the Court, and 17.7% had some trust). For a short 
summary of this study in English, see Gad Barzilai, Courts as Hegemonic Institutions: 
The Israeli Supreme Court in a Comparative Perspective, in ISRAEL—THE DYNAMICS OF 
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 15 (David Levi-Faur et al. eds., 1999).  
 21. See BARZILAI, YUCHTMAN-YA’AR & SEGAL, supra note 20, at 60-62, 72-76; 
Barzilai, supra note 20, at 15-17, 21, 25-26, 30; Gad Barzilai, The Political and Legal 
Culture in Israel in 2 TRENDS IN ISRAELI SOCIETY 707, 790 (Ephraim Ya’ar & Ze’ev 
Shavit eds., 2003) (“[T]he Supreme Court enjoyed mythical presentation as a neutral, 
mamlachti [above sectarian interests], non-partisan institution thus naturally gaining high 
public legitimacy.”). 
 22. See PERI, supra note 8, at 13, 18-19, 123. 
 23. Orly Bar-Kima, An Item with David Levi was Censored and not During the 
Election Propaganda, HAARETZ, May 15, 1996 (Isr.) (reporting several public opinion 
polls). 
 24. See How Does It Work, The Israeli Audience Research Board,  
http://www.midrug-tv.org.il/index.php?dir=site&page=content&cs=3030. 
 25. See Rating, The Israeli Audience Research Board,  
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While Channel One is a public broadcaster following the BBC model; 
Channel Two is a commercially financed station supervised by a council 
appointed by the Government.26 The news editions in Channel Two are 
produced by a news company. Although the company is controlled by 
the same commercial franchisees that control the channel, according to 
the Second Authority for Television and Radio Act, the news should not 
reflect the positions and opinions of the commercial franchisees.27  
In the era before the inception of Channel Two, Mabat was described 
as resembling “something of a televised newspaper” or a “photographed 
radio.”28 The style of coverage was “heavy, deadly serious,” and no 
different to the style characteristic of the Israeli media before the 
inception of televised news.29 The Channel Two news edition imported 
prevailing tendencies from the American media market to Israel. It 
conducted itself as a real industry, acting out of commercial 
considerations with the goal of maximizing profits.30 Thus, since the way 
to maximize profits in television is to provide large amounts of 
entertainment, the age of infotainment and market-driven journalism 
arrived in Israel. The news editions became not only a conduit for 
presenting information but also a medium oriented towards entertaining 
viewers. What will keep viewers watching the news became a central 
aim in choosing and framing new content. This was the ideology of this 
new technology.31 Thus, sensationalist coverage of news events became 
prevalent. News narratives that dramatized, personalized and simplified 
complex issues were now preferred.32 For commercial media, 
  
http://www.midrug-tv.org.il/index.php?dir=site&page=rating (search according to 
“weeks beginning in”).  
 26. See Gideon Doron, The Politics of Mass Communication in Israel, 555 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 163, 174-75 (1998). 
 27. The Second Authority for Television and Radio Act, 1990, provision 64 
(Isr.). 
 28. See Doron, supra note 26, at 170; PERI, supra note 8, at 40-41, 125. 
 29. See PERI, supra note 8, at 125. 
 30. See PERI, supra note 8, at 25-26; ANAT PELEG, OPEN COURT 10 (2012) (Isr.). 
 31. See POSTMAN, supra note 8, at 84-88 (“Entertainment is the supra-ideology of 
all discourse in television.”).  
 32. See PERI, supra note 8, at 41-42, 121-26 (“[T]elevision’s way of treating 
political materials: presenting politics as a game, emphasizing its personal dimension, 
and accentuating human interest and the sensational.”); ALMOG, supra note 14, at 242-43. 
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“everything is about personal politics,” rather than the work of abstract 
forces or ideas.33  
These changes were not restricted to Channel Two. Although its 
revenue is provided by license fees and not by commercials, Channel 
One also adopted the ratings principle as its guiding star and became 
more and more adapted to the “sound bites” era. Items were shortened 
and newsworthiness was determined by the ability to show pictures. An 
empirical study showed no major differences between the two news 
editions in terms of length of news items, position in the lineup and 
presentation style.34 Moreover, scholars argue that the popular press also 
went through a process of “televisionization,” adopting many of the 
features of commercial television news coverage.35  
II. MY HYPOTHESIS, RESEARCH LIMITATIONS & METHOD 
In examining changes to the Court’s public image during the 1990s, 
scholars have overlooked changes in the media. They have pointed to 
changes in the Court’s adjudication or changes in the elites’ disposition 
towards the Court as causes for changes in its public image.36 Yet, as I 
show below,37 these explanations are flawed or incomplete in explaining 
the shift in the Court’s public image. Media scholars who focused on the 
effects of the inception of the commercial channel on the way we 
imagine institutions detected changes regarding only the work of the 
  
 33. See DAVID M. RICCI, GOOD CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICA 199, 215-16 (2004). 
 34. See Gabriel Weinman & Ayelet Goren, Sobriety and Ratings Met Halfway, 
16 PANIM 4 (2001) (Isr.); see also PERI, supra note 8, at 26-27, 41, 125 (“Knowing how 
much the Israelis love and need politics, television editors did not hasten to remove 
political material from the screen but turned it into entertainment, first in the commercial 
channel and soon after in the public channel.”). 
 35. See PERI, supra note 8, at 43-44. “The press itself has undergone a process of 
‘televisionization.’” Id. at 99. 
 36. See, e.g., Dan Avnon, The Israeli Basic Laws’ (Potentially) Fatal Flaw, 32 
ISR. L.R. 535, 538, 543 (1998) (arguing that the Court’s decisions on the definition of 
Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state” in the 1992 basic laws brought fierce public 
criticism of the Court); Menachem Hofnung, Israeli Constitutional Politics: The Fragility 
of Impartiality, 5 ISR. AFFAIRS 34, 36 (1999) (arguing that the “grant” of the authority to 
review legislation in the 1992 Basic Laws, “has caused the courts to be publicly 
perceived as partisan actors in the political arena, whereas previously they were viewed 
as neutral.”). 
 37. See infra section VIII. 
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legislature and executive.38 Based on this literature, my hypothesis is that 
the Court was not immune to these effects. Commercial media’s 
tendency to cover issues through the prism of low politics, its preference 
for conflict and drama and its attempt to sensationalize issues are all 
incompatible with the Court’s mythical image.39 More generally, the 
commercial media’s biases may be in conflict with any attempt to 
preserve an image of expertise of institutions that are publicly salient. It 
tends to transform disputes about policies or values into contests for 
political and personal advantage.40 This simplified all-inclusive frame 
that “everything is personal” conflicts directly with the national high 
courts’ attempt to sustain an image of legal experts. Hence, I hypothesize 
that the shift from Channel One’s “campfire,” to a world of commercial 
television had dire effects on the Court’s mythical image. 
In my previous Article, I argued that even though the Court became 
very active and involved in the political arena, grim assessments of the 
decline in its public support did not materialize since media coverage did 
not change and the Court continued to be presented through a mythical 
prism.41 This Article depicts a major shift in the manner the Court was 
covered by Channel One’s news edition. It does not examine the 
coverage of the Court by Channel Two or by other media venues such as 
newspapers. Although, as explained above, there is a solid basis for the 
assumption that tendencies in the media coverage of the Court portrayed 
in this Article were the same (or perhaps even stronger) in Channel 
Two’s news coverage, further empirical research is still required in order 
to substantiate this assumption.42  
  
 38. See PERI, supra note 8, at 132-39 (titling the sections on television’s effect on 
the branches of government “The Knesset: From Workhorses to Showhorses” and “The 
Government: From Weaving a Future to Blowing Bubbles”). 
 39. See, e.g., WILLIAM HALTOM, REPORTING ON THE COURTS—HOW THE MASS 
MEDIA COVER JUDICIAL ACTIONS 74, 91, 110-11 (1998) (“We expect commercial biases 
to prey upon television reporters, editors, and executives to a greater degree than for 
respective decision makers at newspapers . . . . Expect more emphasis on ‘infotainment’ 
and dramatization because televised pictures tend to become the whole story and 
spectacle overwhelms analysis.”). 
 40. See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: 
AMERICANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 39 (2002). 
 41. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 306-09, 317, 357-61. 
 42. For a defense of examining the Court’s public image using one media outlet 
(the New York Times), see Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme 
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My aim in this Article is not to offer a causal explanation for the 
decline in public support of the Court. Obviously, the decline of public 
confidence in any institution involves multiple causes.43 Beyond the 
difficulty of distilling the effects of the change in the media on public 
confidence for the Court, my argument is limited since it is based upon 
examining the change in coverage in only one central media outlet. But 
even with far more data on the coverage in other media outlets, it would 
be impossible to demonstrate causation between the shift in coverage and 
the decline in the public support of the Court. There is not enough 
polling data on public confidence in the Court in the relevant years to 
show a consistent correlation between changes in the media coverage and 
changes in public support for the Court.44 Without such data, we can 
hardly infer accurately how a change in coverage affected public 
opinion. In addition, people are not inanimate objects that respond in a 
linear, predictable manner. Hence, crude conceptions of causality are 
inadequate to explain changes in people’s views.45 We cannot assume 
that a change in coverage led necessarily to a corresponding change in 
public support. In view of these difficulties, rather than offering a causal 
explanation for the decline of public support for the Court, my Article 
  
Court: FDR’s Court-Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139, 1143 (1987) (“[T]he 
coverage in this elite newspaper tracks closely with other sources of information. 
Furthermore, reports in the New York Times undoubtedly diffuse throughout the nation 
in a ‘two-step flow’ of information.”). 
 43. See PATRICIA MOY & MICHAEL PFAU, WITH MALICE TOWARD ALL?: THE 
MEDIA AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 41 (2000) (“The melding 
of substantive and media explanations for the problem of confidence is a form of blended 
causation . . . .”). 
 44. Cf. id. at 53 (“What is required is an interconnected data set: a content 
analysis of media depictions of institution and opinion surveys to determine whether 
those people who rely on a given communication source perceive the institution in much 
the same manner as the source depicted it.”). 
 45. Michael McCann, Causal versus Constitutive Explanations (or, On the 
Difficulty of Being Positive . . .), 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 457, 459-61 (1996) (“The 
problem is that linear, instrumental conceptions of causality are inadequate tools for 
explaining the dynamic, indeterminate, contingent, interactive processes of judgment, 
choice, and reasoned intentionality of people in action . . . . [Linear] causal analysis tends 
to be either reductionist or evasive about the ‘causes’ (reasons, goals, motives) that figure 
into political action.”). 
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offers a portrayal of the change in the manner the Court was presented to 
the Israeli public.46 
Decisionmakers, scholars and publicists frequently base far-reaching 
conclusions on causal links between various changes in the Court’s 
adjudication and changes in public support for the Court, even though 
they lack any systematic empirical evidence to support their causal 
narrative.47 These causal narratives have a great effect on the way 
different players conduct their behavior. This research provides at least a 
partial empirical basis upon which to evaluate these narratives. As I will 
demonstrate, at times, changes in the Court’s adjudication hardly 
received any exposure in the media, thus making causal links between 
these changes and public support for the Court highly tenuous. 
In the first part of this project, I explained my method for conducting 
this research in detail.48 Two distinctions are worth repeating. First, the 
distinction between filmed and non-filmed items; second, the distinction 
between non-processed results and processed results as it appears in the 
table below. In non-filmed items, the news-anchor reads the report 
without any film segments. These items cannot be tracked by a search in 
Channel One’s computerized database. They were detected only by 
going over the printed news edition line-ups.  
Second, there were news editions in which a number of filmed items 
relating to the same case were broadcast. For example, in the news 
edition on July 29, 1993, four filmed items were broadcast concerning 
the Court’s judgment on John Ivan Demjanjuk’s appeal. One item 
covered the judgment acquitting Demjanjuk from the charges that he was 
  
 46. Cf. SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 11 (2005) (“My purpose is . . . to aim for Verstehen 
(understanding) rather than Erklaurng (causal explanation).”). 
 47. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 358 n. 247 (showing that various scholars 
“assume” in their theories without any empirical foundation “that a change in the Court’s 
discourse is immediately translated to a change in public discourse.”); DANIEL 
FRIEDMANN, THE PURSE AND THE SWORD: THE TRIALS OF THE ISRAELI LEGAL 
REVOLUTION 78 (2013) (Isr.) (the author, who served as the minister of justice, asserting 
without any empirical evidence that the decline of public confidence in the Court is a 
result of the Barak Court’s lack of restraint, especially in issues of state’s security); see 
also id. at 344-48 (arguing that the decline occurred only after Barak retired while relying 
on partial data from opinion polls and then asserting that the decline occurred during 
Barak’s presidency). 
 48. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 316-21. 
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the Treblinka Nazi guard nicknamed Ivan the Terrible (item 14605-93), 
two more items brought reactions to the judgment (item 14609/10-93) 
and the fourth item was an interview with a legal expert who explained 
the decision (item 14608-93). This phenomenon may distort the results. 
In order to prevent such distortions, items relating to the same case, 
broadcast on the same news edition, were counted in the processed data 
as a single item. In the table of results, the processed number of items for 
each year appears in parenthesis. 
I decided to limit the scope of this Article to a four year period 
stretching from 1993 to 1996, since, based on my research, these years 
isolate best the impact of the entrance of Channel Two into the arena. 
The period from 1997 to May 1999 is one of the most turbulent in the 
Court’s history. During this period, the Court decided on a petition that 
demanded the overturning of the Attorney General’s decision not to 
indict Prime Minister Netanyahu in the Bar-On Hebron affair.49 More 
importantly, in February 1999, in the midst of the 1999 election 
campaign, a demonstration against the Court of more than 250,000 
Israelis, mostly ultra-Orthodox, took place in Jerusalem. At the same 
time, only 50,000 Israelis demonstrated in support of the Court.50 In the 
May 1999 elections, for the first time in Israeli history, the Court was 
one of the major issues on which the Israeli public went to vote.51 Hence, 
the period between 1993 and 1996, though extremely turbulent, allows us 
to somewhat isolate the influence of Channel Two’s entrance into the 
arena. 
 
 
 
 
  
 49. HCJ 2534/97 Yahav v. State Attorney 51(3) PD 39 [1997] (Isr.). 
 50. See Shimon Shetreet, Resolving the Controversy over the Form and 
Legitimacy of Constitutional Adjudication in Israel: A Blueprint for Redefining the Role 
of the Supreme Court and the Knesset, 77 TUL. L. REV. 659, 661-65 (2003) (describing 
the events leading to the demonstrations). 
 51. See, e.g., Etta Bick, The Shas Phenomenon and Religious Parties in the 1999 
Elections, 7 ISR. AFFAIRS, 55, 69 (2000) (“Regard for the courts and their decisions was 
another important campaign issue for the secular parties . . . [because of] the ongoing 
conflict between the Haredi community and the secular community on the question of the 
authority of the Supreme Court.”). 
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III. THE AMOUNT OF COVERAGE  
Table 1: News items broadcast on Mabat between 1990 and 1999. 
 
Though the coverage of the Court was on the rise from the beginning 
of the 1990s (in comparison to the 1980s), in 1993-1994 a major shift 
occurred. The average coverage in 1993-1996 was 86.75 items per year 
compared to 43.5 items in 1989-1992, 29.9 items per year in the 1980s, 
and 10.9 in the 1970s.52 While the rather low coverage during the 1980s, 
averaging one item every other week, sheltered the activist Court from 
the public eye,53 in 1994 the Court received an average coverage of 1.77 
items per week and was much more exposed to the public eye. This 
increase in coverage contrasts with the decline in television coverage of 
the U.S. Supreme Court during the same period.54 During the 1990s, 
  
 52. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 321, 323. 
 53. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 330-33 (“It is doubtful whether such a small 
number was enough to tarnish the Court’s mythical image, trivialize its professional 
knowledge, and present it as an active player in the political arena.”). 
 54. See ELIOT E. SLOTNICK & JENNIFER A. SEGAL, TELEVISION NEWS AND THE 
SUPREME COURT, ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO AIR? 159, 165-70 (1998) (examining the 
 
Year Filmed report/ 
(processed) 
Non-
filmed 
report 
Total 
coverage 
1989 12 (10) 17 29 
1990 20 (19) 34 54 
1991 13 (12) 32 45 
1992 19 (16) 27 46 
Total (1989-92) 64 (57) 110 174 
1993 61 (45) 18 79 
1994 82 (76) 10 92 
1995 71 (65) 7 78 
1996 92 (83) 6 98 
Total (1993-96) 306 (269) 41 347 
1997 116 (107) 6 122 
1998 69 (65) 0 69 
1999 122 (108) 2 124 
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American network news editions experienced a decline in audience share 
that led them to appeal to general audiences by airing more 
entertainment. The coverage of the American Supreme Court was just 
another victim of the general shrinkage in the coverage of politics and 
government in the news.55 While infotainment in the U.S. meant “[c]ute 
animal stories displaced stories on tax policy and Supreme Court 
decisions,”56 in Israel, after the changes in communication patterns, there 
followed a rise in coverage of the Court. This rise in coverage is 
undoubtedly related to the Court’s deep involvement, since the mid-
1980s, in the central political controversies of Israeli society, an 
involvement without parallel in the American Court.57 The Court’s deep 
involvement in almost every political controversy made its judgments 
attractive for coverage, not only according to the older media criterion of 
importance but also according to the new criterion of public interest.58  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
“decline in already spartan Court coverage brought about, in part, by changes in the 
broadcast news industry.”). 
 55. See RICHARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
AND THE MEDIA 156-58 (2011). 
 56. Joshua Meyrowitz, The Power of Television News, 7(6) THE WORLD & I 453, 
466 (1992). 
 57. See SLOTNICK & SEGAL, supra note 54, at 228-29 (“coverage of [the 
American] Supreme Court decisions will always represent, except for the truly rare 
‘landmark’ rulings, a residual of scarce broadcast time left over from the day’s more 
pressing and more television-friendly events.”); Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 
2005 Term - Foreword: The Court’s Agenda - and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 32 
(2006) (“When we remove our blinders and survey what the Supreme Court did not do as 
well as what it did, we see clearly just how few of the public’s major issues of concern or 
the nation’s first-order policy decisions come anywhere near the purview of the 
judiciary.”). 
 58. See PERI, supra note 8, at 231 (“in the infotainment era the media deals with 
the ‘interesting’ and not with the ‘important.’”). 
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Figure 1: Number of Items on News Editions from 1989 to 1999 
 
 
In addition to the rise in coverage, the change in media also affected 
the mix of filmed and non-filmed items. While during the period between 
1980 and 1992 only 42.1% of the total coverage were filmed items, 
between 1993 and 1996, 88.1% of the items were filmed items. This shift 
corresponds well with television’s bias to visuals. As a primarily visual 
medium, footage is a pre-condition for the coverage of any topic. 
Part of the explanation for the big leap in coverage in 1993 is in the 
lengthening of Mabat. Channel One, in view of the upcoming 
competition from Channel Two, gradually began changing its news 
edition several months before the official inception of its competitor.59 In 
October 1993, a month before Channel Two’s official inception, Channel 
One lengthened its main news edition from half an hour to a full hour in 
an attempt to ensure high ratings for a longer duration each evening, 
since the heads of the Channel believed that Israelis would continue to be 
loyal to the Channel’s flag program.60 There is no doubt that this change, 
coupled with the shortening of items, allowed broadcasting more items 
per news edition and thus is responsible in part for the rise in coverage. 
  
 59. Channel Two broadcast since 1986 on what was titled “experimental mode.” 
However, it was not allowed to produce its own news edition until its official inception in 
1993. 
 60. See Irit Rosenblum, One Year Later, One Hour Earlier, HAARETZ, Mar. 31, 
1994 (Isr.); Irit Rosenblum, Will Try to Reproduce the ‘Kastner’ Success, HAARETZ, Feb. 
9, 1995 (Isr.). 
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But even before this change, there was a significant rise in coverage. 
From the beginning of 1993 and up until the end of September of that 
year, 53 filmed items and 14 non-filmed items were broadcast. Hence, 
the rise in coverage cannot be attributed only to the lengthening of the 
news edition but is related to a deeper change in the character of Channel 
One’s news edition as a result of its preparation for the entrance of 
Channel Two. Moreover, though two years later the news edition was 
shortened to forty-five minutes, the rise in coverage of the Court 
continued in the years afterwards (with the exception of 1998).  
According to some scholars, visibility is inherently dangerous to 
institutions such as courts whose legitimacy is based on expertise.61 First, 
visibility has the potential to expose the inner politics of a court, thus 
presenting it not as an empire of law, but as an empire of men.62 Second, 
the logic of television as a medium dictates trivializing and simplifying 
the legal language. Hence, an increase in visibility may expose the 
Court’s claim to expertise in deciding political controversies as a sham. 
Concealment is thus best for maintaining public belief in the Court’s 
expert knowledge.63 However, in my previous Article, I showed that 
although the rise in coverage had the potential to erode the Court’s image 
as an expert, it did not, since the media continued to present the Court 
through a mythical prism. Even when television covered the Court more 
frequently, as it deepened its intervention in the political realm, it was 
still portrayed as an apolitical body, intervening in the political arena in 
the name of legal expertise.64 However, as will be elaborated below, the 
shift in the prism through which the Court is covered gave an entirely 
different meaning to the steep rise in coverage starting in 1993.  
  
 61. See JOSHUA MEYROWITZ, NO SENSE OF PLACE: THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA ON SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 63-66 (1985). 
 62. See Christopher D. Johnston & Brandon L. Bartels, Sensationalism and 
Sobriety, Differential Media Exposure and Attitudes toward American Courts, 74(2) PUB. 
OP. Q. 260, 262 (2010) (“Given the strong distaste citizens have for the conflicts and 
compromises intrinsic to the political process . . . the ability of the courts to shield their 
inner political workings, or ‘backstage’ areas, from the public is an important factor in 
maintaining public support.”).  
 63. See id. at 261-62. 
 64. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 330-33. 
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IV. “OUTSIDE THE COURT” 
The shift in coverage of the Court is most vivid in the category I dub 
“outside the Court.” In the items included in this category, the Court is 
covered in a capacity other than its decision-making capacity, i.e., not in 
its routine, daily work. This category includes items on the appointment 
and retirement of judges, items on the public appearances of judges, 
reflective items on the Court as an institution, etc. The “outside the 
Court” category is the only one in which the coverage is focused on 
judges as individuals and on the Court as an institution. These items 
expose best the controlling prism, the “glasses,” through which the media 
views the Court as an institution. In coverage of concrete Court 
decisions, this controlling prism is harder to detect since the substantive 
issue at play colors the media’s framing of the Court. But this “outside 
the Court” category offers a very effective barometer for the media’s 
view of the Court, without any substantive issue tainting the picture.  
The Judges’ Election Committee, which appoints all judges in Israel, 
is made up of three judges of the Supreme Court, two representatives of 
the Israeli Bar Association, two government ministers (one of whom is 
the Minister of Justice), and two members of the Knesset (the Israeli 
parliament).65 Though judges constitute a minority of the Committee, in 
practice, at least in the period examined in this Article and with regard to 
the Supreme Court judges, the Committee was dominated by the three 
Supreme Court judges and no judge was selected to the Court without the 
incumbent judges’ consent.66 During the period covered by this study, 
five judges were appointed to the Court.67 
Until 1993, the only item covering the selection committee was 
broadcast in 1982 and focused on a controversy in the Knesset as to 
whether one of its members should remain a committee member, as one 
  
 65. Basic Laws: The Judiciary, Art., 4. 
 66. See Michael Mandel, Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel, 33 
ISR. L. REV. 259, 281-82 (1999) (arguing that in view of the dominance of Supreme Court 
judges in the appointment process, “[t]here appears to be no constitutional court so self-
perpetuating in the world”); MAUTNER, supra note 17, at 164-65; Hirschl, supra note 11, 
at 487. 
 67. See Eli M Salzberger, Temporary Appointments and Judicial Independence: 
Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Findings from the Supreme Court of Israel, 19 
MEHKAREI MISHPAT 541, 563 (2003) (Isr.). 
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of two Knesset representatives, in light of his appointment as a deputy-
minister.68 Thus, even when covering the appointment of judges, when 
the Court is unable to divert attention from the people who produce the 
judgments to the judgments themselves,69 television continued to cover 
the Court through a mythical lens. The appointments of new judges were 
covered exclusively during the inaugural phase, thus producing festive 
items full of praise for the nominee and the Court, presenting the 
nominee as a consensual figure and emphasizing his judicial 
qualifications.70 Television framed the inauguration ceremony as a “rite 
of transformation” in which a nominee entered under the veil of the 
mythical image, becoming a mere instrument of the rule of law.71 By not 
giving visibility to issues such as controversies regarding certain 
candidates, which were well known among the legal community,72 
television avoided concentrating on the personalities of the nominees, 
thus supporting the image of the Court as an empire of law, not of men. 
As opposed to the coverage of political institutions which is focused on 
the relationships between politicians, their personalities, and their 
motives, the avoidance of dealing with the candidate’s character 
presented the Court as a forum that decides solely on the merits of the 
case without any political or personal tendencies stemming from the 
personalities and backgrounds of the judges presiding. Thus, it is no 
wonder that the coverage of the judicial nomination process contributed 
to the Court’s mythical image.73  
  
 68. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 343. 
 69. Cf. RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
PRESS 134-36 (1994) (“The [American Supreme] Court has long sought to direct press 
coverage to its cases . . . the Court has been stunningly successful at focusing press 
attention on its product and deflecting attention away from the individuals who produce 
it.”). 
 70. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 339-42. 
 71. See Paul W. Kahn, Marbury in the Modern Era: Comparative 
Constitutionalism in a New Key, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2677, 2687 (2003) (“Confirmation is 
literally a ritual of transformation - a rite of passage . . . . Nothing is allowed to survive 
that breaks from one world into the other.”). 
 72. See, e.g., NOMI LEVITSKY, THE SUPREMES: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 197-
98 (2006) (Isr.) (discussing the controversy over the appointment of Judge Cheshin to the 
Court).   
 73. See Gad Barzilai, Between the Rule of Law and the Laws of the Ruler: Israeli 
Legal Culture and the Supreme Court, 152 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 193, 199 (1997) (“The 
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In 1993, the situation changed with the broadcast of an item covering 
the Judicial Selection Committee’s inability to agree for the second time 
on the appointment of judges to the Court (item 20030-93, from 
10.17.93). The reporter noted that Dorit Beinisch, then the state attorney, 
was the main candidate under consideration. The rise of “television 
logic” required personalizing issues.74 Thus, the coverage of 
appointments changed and the nominee was put at the center. Moreover, 
for the first time, the committee’s failure to agree on an appointment was 
presented to the public. Thus, rather than presenting the candidate at the 
inauguration phase, entering under the mythical veil in a celebratory 
ceremony, the candidate is presented as “all too human” in her failure to 
receive the committee’s approval.75  
Less than a month later, Mabat broadcast an item covering a petition 
to the HCJ challenging the secrecy of the committee’s discussions and its 
refusal to publish the names of the potential nominees to the Court.76 The 
reporter noted the peculiarity of the situation in which the judges 
presiding needed to decide on the working procedure of a committee in 
which their colleagues preside (item 22222-93, from 11.14.93). While 
the petition was dismissed, it began a process that ended with changes to 
the committee’s working procedure. Beginning in 1997, the names of the 
candidates to courts have been published at least twenty-one days before 
the committee adjourns.77  
The appointment of Vice President Barak to the position of the 
Court’s president received unprecedented coverage for a judicial 
appointment. During that period, according to convention, the position of 
president of the Court was awarded strictly on the basis of seniority, thus 
making the process of “choosing” a president a mere formality. Yet, the 
selection committee’s meeting, in which Barak was “chosen” for that 
  
judicial nominations process contributed to the myth that judges were not political 
actors.”). 
 74. See PERI, supra note 8, at 97 (“Television does not like to deal with issues as 
abstract topics and prefers to personalize them.”). 
 75. However, television did not report that the Court’s President at the time, Meir 
Shamgar, objected to Beinisch’s nomination. See Tova Zimoki & Amir Shoan, The 
Beinisch Test, YEDIOTH AHARONOT – 7 Days, Aug. 25, 2006, § 19, at 26 (Isr.); LEVITSKY, 
supra note 72, at 78-79. 
 76. HCJ 5571/93 Zitrin v. Minister of Justice 48(1) PD 661 [1993] (Isr.). 
 77. See AMNON RUBINSTIEN & BARAK MEDINA, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
THE STATE OF ISRAEL 133, n.28 (6th ed. 2005) (Isr.). 
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position, was the opening item of the news edition (item 18937-95, from 
7.19.95). On its face, the item does not deviate from the mythical model: 
the reporter described Barak’s rich career and the Justice Minister David 
Libai (Labor) congratulated President Barak in a short interview, stating 
that with this appointment he can “congratulate all the people of Israel.” 
Yet, as the reporter stressed, this was the first time the committee’s 
gathering was shown to the public from inside the conference room—just 
nine people sitting in a room behind a table. Destroying the mythical 
image of a court does not require public attacks against it. To unveil a 
myth, it is enough to expose the institution in its most intimate moment.78 
For the Court these intimate moments occur during the appointment 
process and especially in the selection committee’s discussions. Instead 
of showing a judge nominated to the role of the president of the Court by 
the President of Israel in a ceremony full of majesty as done in the past,79 
television presented a committee of people, some of whom were 
politicians, sitting in a room and crowning one of them as president of 
the Court. Moreover, the reporter notes that Barak is nicknamed “the 
state’s director general” and “the king of activism.” This focus on Barak 
as an individual judge with his own agenda, rather than as merely part of 
an institution committed to the rule of law, further eroded the mythical 
image.80  
President Barak’s inaugural ceremony also received extensive and 
unprecedented coverage. A portion of his inauguration speech was 
broadcast in a special section in the news edition covering the ceremony. 
President Barak, as the reporter noted, addressed the concerns of many 
regarding his tendency to intervene in the work of the other branches. He 
stressed that he is “not a politician” and “does not strive for power, does 
not aspire to govern.” (item 20764-95 from 8.13.95). The commentary by 
  
 78. Cf. Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1, 18 
(1998) (“Why should the direct gaze of others be so damaging, even if what is seen is 
something already known, and not objectionable? If newspapers all over the country 
published nude photographs of a political candidate, it would be difficult for him to 
continue with the campaign even if no one could charge him with any fault.”). 
 79. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 341-42. 
 80. See Stephen Breyer, Communication Media and Its Relationship with 
Supreme Courts, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1083, 1086 (1998) (“The more the media writes 
about an individual judge, the greater the probability the judge will become a known 
‘personality,’ lessening (in my opinion), the power of the law.”). 
60 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.1  
Moshe Negbi, the legal commentator of Channel One, following the item 
corresponded to the patterns of the mythical image. For example, though 
his portrayal of Barak may easily fit that of a politician (“the prophet and 
flag-bearer of the constitutional revolution”; long-term goals which 
justify “lowering his profile” and “not to emphasize the true goals of the 
constitutional revolution” during the beginning of his term as president; 
the Court’s president as setting aims for the Court) rather than a judge 
(judging on a case-by-case basis rather than promoting a certain agenda; 
the Court’s president as first among equals, “merely” one vote on the 
Court), the commentary had a totally different tone. And indeed, the 
anchorman reacted to Negbi’s description of Barak’s agenda favorably, 
saying: “[H]e wants us to be like the advanced western states” (item 
20765-95 from 8.13.95).  
A few weeks earlier, in a commentary on the Friday edition of Mabat 
(Yoman) after an interview with the retiring President Meir Shamgar, 
Negbi noted that contrary to Prime Minister Rabin’s relationship with 
Shamgar, which is based on “mutual respect from their service in the 
IDF [the Israeli military], the history of the relationship between Rabin 
and Professor Barak is a story of severe clashes that led to mutual 
hostility and lack of confidence.” Yet, after a presentation of the roots of 
their hostility, Negbi summarized, that as opposed to Rabin’s claim in his 
book that Barak “seeks an image of a brave person while in practice he 
follows public opinion,” Barak is guided not by “populism” and “a desire 
for power” but “by a commitment to the rule of law” (item 19639-95, 
from 7.28.95). This commentary, iterated while background music 
played and pictures with funky graphics appeared, distills the clash 
between the infotainment of the commercial media and the mythical 
image of the Court. The former encourages the presentation of the 
relationship between the Court and the prime minister as a clash full of 
drama between two personalities and based on low politics, while the 
latter dictates presenting President Barak as guided solely by the rule of 
law. Needless to say, never before had television broadcast an item 
focused on the relationship between the president of the Court and the 
prime minister. 
Until Barak’s presidency, the Court had never been presented as being 
dominated by one persona. This was an essential part of its mythical 
image, the image of the rule of law and not the rule of particular men and 
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women.81 Presenting the Court’s judgments as dependent upon the 
subjectivity of a particular judge erodes “the distinction between the rule 
of law and the rule of men.”82 Now, as a result of the commercial 
media’s tendency to personalize the news, the Court was presented as 
Barak’s Court. Ironically, Barak wrote in 1987:  
The American Supreme Court is perceived as a ‘political’ court . . . the 
Israeli Supreme Court is not a ‘political’ body, and it is not perceived 
as such by the public . . . . There is no distinction between the court of 
one president (‘Olshan’s Court’) and the court of another president 
(‘Agranat’s Court’). We should continue this tradition. A transatlantic 
inspiration in this field is not desirable.83  
In 1995, President Barak’s wife, Elisheva, was appointed to the 
National Labor Court. The coverage of her inaugural ceremony gave 
visibility to claims of nepotism in the selection process. The reporter 
noted that, within the selection committee, there was a “struggle between 
the fear of the appearance of family favoritism and discrimination against 
a talented judge.” In a short interview, Minister of Justice Libai declared 
that the selection was solely based on Elisheva Barak’s merits. 
“However,” he added that to avoid claims of “discrimination or 
preference,” the situation of appointment of two spouses as judges 
should be avoided in the future (item 22052-95 from 8.29.95). 
The accusations of low or personal politics in the appointment process 
would resurface in 1997 when the chairman of the Israeli Bar Dror 
Hoter-Ishay explained that he objected to the appointment of Professor 
Yitzhak Engelard to the Court because he lacked experience as a lawyer 
and since “it is not proper to nominate your friends to the Court.” The 
reporter added that this insinuation regarding the friendship between 
Barak and Engelrad did not prevent the majority of committee members 
from voting for the nomination, against the minority opinion of the two 
Bar representatives (item 9744-97 from 5.4.97; item 12727-97 from 
  
 81. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW 79-80 (1999) (“The rule 
of law must, therefore, work to suppress the appearance of the justice as a unique subject 
. . . .”). 
 82. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW 22, 164 (1997).  
 83. Aharon Barak, The American Constitution and Israeli Law, 26 ZMANIM 13, 
26 (1987) (Isr.).  
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7.13.97). The coverage in these items gave visibility to suggestions that 
personal politics rather than apolitical expertise or even political 
convictions (high politics) are behind the appointments. The coverage 
jumped directly from the mythical frame, which presented appointments 
as determined based solely on apolitical expertise, to the low politics. 
Not politics in terms of certain policy goals or even partisan ideology, 
but politics in its lowest form: power politics and nepotism. In the past, 
there was a clear distinction in television coverage between appointments 
to the judicial branch and appointments to the political branches. The 
former were presented as based on the candidate’s competence in the 
field of law; the latter were presented, at least partly, as the result of low 
politics and logrolling.84 Now the distinction was no longer clear. 
Commercial media’s preference to frame appointments as driven by low 
politics is part of its tendency to personalize events and simplify news.85 
This tendency created a new framing for covering the appointment 
phase. Lessons from the U.S. teach us that this kind of personal framing 
(“nine old men”), rather than criticism of the institution in more abstract 
terms on an ideological level, is the most lethal to courts’ sociological 
legitimacy.86 Thus, while the coverage in Israel did not mention the 
political or ideological views of the candidates, as is customary in 
coverage of Supreme Court appointments in the U.S.,87 the low-politics 
angle may have been much more lethal in eroding the Court’s mythical 
image. 
  
 84. See Ronen Shamir, The Politics of Reasonableness, in ISRAEL: FROM 
MOBILIZED TO CIVIL SOCIETY? 281 (Yoav Peled & Adi Ophir eds, 2001) (Isr.).   
 85. See PERI, supra note 8, at 113 (“[T]elevision has led to personalization of 
events and personification of news . . . ‘The messenger becomes the message.’”). 
 86. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 2596, 2635 (2003) (“[H]ow one says things matter . . . Conservatives figured out 
that it was easier to attack individual judges than the institution of judicial review, and 
that successful attacks depended on spinning stories the right way. Progressives spend 
their time railing at the Court, and doing so in a fairly technical way unlikely to capture 
public attention.”). 
 87. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE 6 (2007) (noting that in 
popular debates of Supreme Court nominations the nominee is frequently depicted as an 
ideologue who would decide cases on the basis of a political agenda); Harvie Wilkinson 
III, Madison Lecture Toward One America: A Vision in Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 332 
(2008) (“The media identify judges as Republican or Democrat; the confirmation process 
sends nominees through bruising partisan disputes in which underlying merit is 
obscured . . . .”). 
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Menachem Mautner recently suggested that the decline in public 
confidence for the Court is the result “more than anything else” of the 
public exposure of low politics in the appointments to the ranks of the 
Court.88 Mautner detects several affairs, all reported after 2005, in which 
judicial appointments were portrayed in the media as tainted by nepotism 
and other considerations of low politics. Mautner also describes reports 
in the media, during the same period, of corruption in the selection of 
clerks to the Court. According to Mautner, in view of the Court’s activist 
intervention in political life, with the declared goal to fight corrupt 
government appointments, its failure to live up to its own high standards, 
was extremely disturbing for the public.89 As demonstrated above, the 
exposure of claims that low politics controls the Court’s hidden regions 
occurred earlier than Mautner detected. 
Not only was the coverage of the appointment process now different, 
the coverage of retirement of judges had also changed. In 1993, three 
judges retired. Two of them, Judges Elon and Maltz, offered criticism of 
the Court’s activism in an interview they gave on their retirement day. 
Judge Elon stated that he was “worried concerning the image of the 
Court” in the face of its growing activism. The reporter interviewing 
Elon asked him a question unthinkable in television coverage during the 
1980s. Elon was asked to respond to the claim that, when it came to the 
selection of judges to the Court, the “clique” of judges did not follow the 
standards of impartiality they demand in their judgments from other 
public officials. Judge Elon answered that the judges appointed should 
first fit the high post; second, he stated that there should be pluralism so 
that the judges will have diverse ideologies (item 23257-93 from 
11.24.93). Judge Maltz said that the Court should stay away from the 
political arena and should intervene less in the Knesset’s work. He also 
told the reporter that his view was now a minority view on the Court 
(item 18710-93, from 9.28.93). This kind of critique did not exist in 
television items covering judges’ retirement before 1993.90 
  
 88. MAUTNER, supra note 17, at 165. 
 89. See MAUTNER, supra note 17, at 160-69 (arguing that the Court’s 
involvement in “the appointment process in the past three decades . . . more than anything 
else, has contributed to the exposure of the political normative system underlying the 
Court’s conduct and to the deterioration of the Court’s status and legitimacy.”). 
 90. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 340 (“[T]he coverage of the death or retirement 
of judges was full of praises for the individual judge and for the Court as a whole.”).  
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Yet not all items that covered the appointment and the retirement of 
judges after Channel Two entered the arena diverged from the mythical 
model. Judge Beinisch’s inauguration ceremony was covered in the same 
fashion in which appointments and retirements of judges were covered 
during the 1980s (item 2988-96 from 12.25.95). This item presented a 
festive and consensual atmosphere in line with the mythical image of the 
Court.  
Until 1994, criticism of the Court was covered almost always as part 
of reactions to the Court’s judgments. Between 1994 and 1996, sixteen 
items were dedicated to unprecedented criticism of the Court that was 
unrelated to any specific judgment. This criticism came mainly from 
religious parties and from the Chairman of the Bar. Before 1993, the 
Court received extensive coverage when it affected the political arena via 
its judgments.91 Now, as the Court became the focus of the political arena 
independently of specific judgments, television coverage soon followed. 
During the period examined, television covered harsh statements 
against the Court by the spiritual leader of the Sepharadic religious party 
Shas, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef (item 23771-96, from 10.9.96) and articles in 
newspapers affiliated to ultra-orthodox Jews against the Court, as well as 
threats to harm President Barak (item 20945-96, from 8.27.96; item 
21221-96, from 8.26.96). Law professors, politicians from both the right 
and the left and former judges condemned these threats and attacks 
against the Court. Their reactions were covered extensively (items 
20947-96 from 8.27.96; 22107-96 from 9.8.96; 21565-96 from 9.3.96). 
The Minister of Justice Tzachi Hanegbi (Likud) issued strong statements 
condemning the “attacks on the Court.” Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu was more ambivalent. Though he condemned the threats on 
judges and stressed the important role of an independent Court as a pillar 
of Israeli democracy, he stated that he was examining the Court’s 
authorities (item 22107-96, from 9.8.96).  
Grievances about the Court’s bias against religious Jews, especially 
the ultra-Orthodox, were for the first time widely covered by television. 
This coverage not only expressed their attitude toward the Court,92 but 
  
 91. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 323 (“[W]henever the Court appeared as a major 
player in the political arena—affecting a highly controversial political dispute—it was 
covered extensively.”). 
 92. See GAVISON, KREMNITZER & DOTAN, supra note 5, at 106 (discussing the 
ultra-Orthodox’s alienation from the Supreme Court). 
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also started to erode its neutral image in coverage. Knesset members, 
deputy-ministers and ministers, both from ultra-orthodox parties and 
from the religious-Zionist party (Mafdal), condemned any threats of 
violence but added sharp criticism of Barak’s judicial activism. Knesset 
Member (MK), Arye Gamlieal (Shas) stated that Barak is “overstepping 
the boundaries of the law, taking to himself more powers than the laws 
allows, interpreting the law according to his liberal, universal views. He 
causes all the problems.” (item 20945-96, from 8.27.96). MK Igal Bibi 
(the National Religious Party, Mafdal) declared that Barak is “causing 
the destruction of democracy in Israel.” (item 20945-96, from 8.27.96). 
Thus, various speakers suggested changing the system of selecting 
judges and restricting the Court’s authorities so that it would not “take 
over” the Knesset’s authorities. Visibility in coverage was given to the 
contention that the judges decide ideological issues according to their 
personal views, disregarding legal reasoning, as well as to the claim that 
Judge Barak is an “agent” of a leftist party (Meretz).  
In the past, even when criticized, the Court was not depicted as 
partisan or as exceeding the law based on the judges’ personal views. 
Moreover, there were occasions in which the Court intervened in highly 
contentious political controversies – such as the legality of a settlement – 
that almost demanded a political framing (which the judges expected). 
And yet the mythical prism continued to control the Court’s framing;93 
but now it was framed as affiliated to one political camp in Israeli 
society. Identifying the Court with partisan politics, rather than merely 
claiming that it is political, in the sense of making ideological decisions, 
is lethal for the judicial institution’s image as neutral.94 Thus, the 
perception of the Court as an objective, politically neutral and principled 
decisionmaker, a perception that is crucial for its enduring public 
  
 93. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 345-48, 350, 354-55 (“Reporters continued to 
contrast between the Court’s legal neutral domain and the political arena . . . . Indeed, the 
reports still adhered to the notion that although the Court was dealing with political 
issues, its discretion was guided by legal considerations and not by political ones.”). 
 94. See Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional 
History, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1721, 1725 (2001) (“It is one thing to say that a judge’s 
political ideology influences her constitutional interpretations. It is quite another to say 
that her partisan political preferences do.”). 
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support, was undermined.95 Robert Dahl once wrote, in the context of the 
American Supreme Court, that “much of the legitimacy of the court’s 
decisions rests upon the fiction that it is not a political institution but 
exclusively a legal one . . . .”96 For an Israeli watching Channel One’s 
news edition, the ability to distinguish the process of decision making in 
the Court from the process in the political arena started to disappear.  
Though the coverage tended to portray the situation as “attacks” 
solely by the religious public on the Court (see for example, item 24680-
96, from 10.22.96), visibility was also given to harsh criticism of the 
Court made by the chairman of the Israeli Bar, Dror Hoter-Ishay. Many, 
including the Minister of Justice, condemned Hoter-Ishay’s statements, 
which were first published in an interview by an ultra-Orthodox 
newspaper (item 1244-97, from 11.27.96; 1335-97, from 11.28.96). 
Though Hoter-Ishay’s criticism was presented as unrepresentative of the 
general view among the majority of lawyers (item 1335-97, from 
11.28.9697), criticism of the Court as an institution was no longer 
restricted in television coverage to the religious sections of society.  
When the selection committee assembled just after Hoter-Ishay’s 
interview, his criticism penetrated the coverage of this body that was 
once beyond reproach. The reporter noted that Hoter-Ishay, a member of 
the committee, did not apologize for his statements. The justice minister 
and MK Rubinstein, both members of the committee, criticized Hoter-
Ishay harshly, but another member of the committee, MK Rivlin said: 
“After all, we learned from the Supreme Court that there are no sacred 
cows in Israel and that everything is justiciable. The Court is also 
justiciable.” (item 1396-97, from 12.1.96). 
President Barak was quoted in one of the items as giving advice to his 
fellow judges not to play into the hands of their critics by being dragged 
into political and social controversies (item 20945-96, from 8.27.96). But 
the Court was no longer presented as an apolitical player standing above 
  
 95. Cf. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of 
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 
DUKE L.J. 703, 708-14 (1994) (arguing with regards to the American Supreme Court that 
“perceptions of political neutrality bear an important relationship to Court legitimacy.”). 
 96. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 280 (1957). 
 97. In this item, covering the induction ceremony to the bar, the reporter states 
that Hoter-Ishay’s criticism caused strain and embarrassment to the audience.  
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and outside of the political arena. The attacks on President Barak with no 
connection to a specific judgment symbolized the shift in the Court’s 
image: President Barak was attacked as the head of a political institution, 
similarly to the fashion of attacking the prime minister for every failure 
of his government. 
In 1996, before the election of the first Netanyahu government, 
Justice Minister David Libai (Labor) publicly criticized courts in view of 
a lenient verdict given by a district court in a famous rape case.98 Libai 
noted that, if contrary to his hopes, the “appeals court” cannot “straighten 
out” judges and create the proper level of sentencing, there would be no 
choice for the legislator but to create mandatory minimum sentences in 
rape crimes to constrain judicial discretion. In response, President Barak 
sent to the minister a letter. Television thus got an excellent chance to 
cover the Court according to its new and preferred personal frame. After 
a short presentation by the anchor, the reporter began his report noting 
that  
Judge Aharon Barak has created many precedents for the legal system, 
and on this occasion he also created two precedents: first, a piercing 
criticism of the justice minister; second, Judge Barak made his letter 
public [waving a copy of the letter] so as to make the public aware of 
his concern for the judicial system and in order to demonstrate 
leadership. (item 3786-96, from 1.3.96).99  
After providing more details on Barak’s letter, the reporter explained 
the lack of response from the minister by noting, “Minister Libai asked 
  
 98. Since Libai did not discuss explicitly the Supreme Court, the item covering 
his criticism was not detected by my search and thus was not counted in my results. 
Barak’s response was of course detected.  
 99. Barak’s letter was not “unprecedented.” In January 1952, in a discussion at 
the Knesset, the Justice Minister at that period, Dov Yosef, criticized judges on their 
lenient verdicts against those convicted in violence against policemen. The President of 
the Supreme Court at that time, Moshe Zmora, wrote a letter to the speaker of the Knesset 
protesting against the minister’s criticism. In a response, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and 
Yosef criticized Zmora on his intervention in Knesset’s discussions. ELYAKIM 
RUBINSTEIN, JUDGES OF THE LAND: THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF THE ISRAEL SUPREME 
COURT 97-100 (1980) (Isr.) (noting that since Zmora’s letter there was no other incident 
in which judges made public their critique towards politicians who criticized the Court). 
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tonight not to escalate the verbal confrontation and the wrangle with 
Judge Aharon Barak.” 
During the period between 1993 and 1996, public figures began to 
criticize the Court in statements that were focused on issues not directly 
related to it. The Court became just another player in the mix of political 
debate. For example, in 1994 Prime Minister Rabin made a speech after 
the IDF failed in its rescue operation of Nachshon Wachsman, an Israeli 
soldier who was kidnapped by Hamas terrorists. Rabin, who was hardly 
an admirer of the Court’s activist tendencies, said: “it is inconceivable 
that a member of Hamas, who was an accomplice to a murder, can 
submit a petition to the HCJ on not getting the proper amount of sleep 
and will receive a judgment because this is the law, [in an ironic tone of 
voice:] I do not have a complaint toward the HCJ, I want the authority to 
administratively arrest all Hamas leaders without legal babble 
complexities . . . .” (item 24276-94, from 10.19.1994). The Court became 
a fully-fledged player in the political arena and as such it was criticized 
by politicians in items that had no connection to the coverage of a 
specific judgment or to another development (such as judicial 
nominations) in which the Court was the focal point. A day after the 
prime minister’s critique, one of the most devoted defenders of the 
Court, MK Dan Meridor (Likud), reacted to Rabin’s criticism of the 
Court offering the sound bite “we need to fight Hamas, not Bagaz [the 
HCJ in Hebrew].” (item 24372-94 from 10.20.1994).  
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
In 1992, the Knesset enacted Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which established a partial bill 
of rights. These two Basic Laws were added to nine already in existence, 
which anchored the institutional structure of the state. Before 1992, 
according to the Court’s adjudication, the status of all the Basic Laws 
was similar to ordinary laws. Two major differences did exist. First, 
according to a decision of the Knesset from 1950, when the piecemeal 
legislation of the Basic Laws was completed, they would form Israel’s 
Constitution. Second, in 1969 the Supreme Court invoked the authority 
to review and invalidate laws that violated the few entrenched provisions 
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anchored in the Basic Laws.100 In the realm of human rights, the Court 
was limited in the pre-1992 era to judicial review of administrative acts, 
based on the “implied bill of rights” doctrine it created.101  
The enactment of the two 1992 Basic Laws received scarce media 
coverage and was hardly at the center of the public discourse, either 
before or after the enactment.102 In 1995 the Supreme Court, led by its 
new President Aharon Barak, essentially adopted the “constitutional 
revolution” thesis in the Bank Hamizrachi case.103 He offered this thesis 
in an academic lecture a few years earlier.104 According to this thesis, the 
two new Basic Laws confer on the Court the power to invalidate laws 
inconsistent with the 1992 Basic Laws without any link to the question of 
entrenchment. The Court also began establishing the understanding that 
the 1992 legislation created normative gradation so that all previous 
Basic Laws should be seen as higher laws, i.e., as Israel’s Constitution.105  
The Court acted in a highly activist fashion in adopting the 
“constitutional revolution” thesis. Moshe Landau, a former president of 
the Court, went so far as to claim that Barak had led the Court to 
“granting Israel a constitution through [the] Court’s decisions.”106 Yet at 
least television coverage did not grant any extended coverage to this 
Court-led “revolution.” Only six filmed items, which are 1.9% of the 
  
 100. See Gavison, supra note 11, at 366-71 (describing Israel’s constitutional 
history). 
 101. See Hirschl, supra note 11, at 478. 
 102. See Gideon Sapir, Constitutional Revolutions: Israel as a Case-study, 5 INT’L 
J.L. IN CONTEXT 355, 364-65, 370-71 (2009) (“No evidence, however, supports the claim 
stating that the significance of the constitutional revolution was presented to, discussed 
and broadly supported by the public prior to the Knesset vote on the adoption of the new 
Basic Laws. The issue received minimal media coverage at the time, both before and 
after the enactment of the Basic Laws.”). 
 103. CA 6821/93 Bank HaMizrachi United Ltd. v. Migdal Communal Village 
49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.), translated at  
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/93/210/068/z01/93068210.z01.htm (last visited Sept. 
11, 2014).   
 104. See Aharon Barak, A Constitutional Revolution: Israel’s Basic Laws, 4 
CONST. F. 83 (1992-1993) (presenting the “constitutional revolution” thesis). 
 105. See Gavison, supra note 11, at 371-72; Rivka Weill, Hybrid 
Constitutionalism: The Israeli Case for Judicial Review and Why We Should Care, 30 
BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 349, 350 (2012). 
 106. Moshe Landau, Granting Israel a Constitution Through Court Decisions, 3 
MISHPAT U-MIMSHAL 697 (1996) (Isr.). 
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filmed items covering the Court during the period between 1993 and 
1996, focused on the development of the “constitutional revolution.” The 
subsequent influence of the “constitutional revolution” was also covered 
in several other items. The item that covered the hearing in the Ganimat 
case107  (item 13629-95, from 5.14.95) and the items that covered the 
Mitrael affair108 can be added to the “constitutional revolution” category 
(items 1057-97, from 11.25.96; 1156-95, from 12.26.94; 20310-93, from 
10.22.93). The former case focused on the effect of Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Liberty, on the rights of detainees. The latter affair dealt 
with the effect of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, on the import of 
non-Kosher meat. Yet I classified the items covering them under the 
criminal law and the state and religion categories respectively, since the 
focus of the coverage was not the influence of the constitutional 
revolution.109 But even when adding these items to the “constitutional 
revolution” category, the total number of filmed items in which the 
constitutional revolution was covered is only 3.2% of the filmed items 
broadcast in the entire period between 1993 and 1996.  
The first item in which the “constitutional revolution” thesis was 
presented in Mabat was broadcast on December 1994 when television 
covered Barak’s lecture on the 1992 Basic Laws given at the Bar-Ilan 
University (item 28326-94 from 12.6.94). This was hardly Barak’s first 
lecture on this topic. Since May 1992, he had given numerous lectures on 
the two new Basic Laws110 with the declared intent to promote the 
“constitutional revolution” thesis so as to enhance the public legitimacy 
of this invisible revolution. Barak even explained that he used the term 
  
 107. HCJ 2316/95 Ganimat v. Israel 39(4) PD 589 [1995] (Isr.). 
 108. HCJ 3872/93 Mitrael v. The Prime Minister 47(5) PD 485 [1993] (Isr.); HJC 
4676/94 Mitrael v. Israeli Knesset 50(5) PD 15 [1996] (Isr.). 
 109. The items covering the Miller case (a petition challenging the Israeli air force 
policy banning women from becoming combat pilots (classified under “security forces” 
category)) is also related to the constitutional category since the judgment is saturated 
with references to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. 
Minister of Defense 49(4) PD 94 [1995] (Isr.), translated at  
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/ 410/045/Z01/94045410.z01.htm. However, no 
reference is made in the two items covering the affair (items 16557-95 from 6.21.95, 
25388-95 from 11.8.95) to the Basic Law.  
 110. Barak, supra note 104. 
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“revolution” to capture public attention.111 The item was the last in the 
news edition’s lineup and both the anchorman and the reporter presented 
the constitutional revolution not as a major change in the state’s 
constitutional structure but mainly as a struggle between the religious 
parties and the Supreme Court, and especially then Supreme Court Vice-
President Aharon Barak. Two Knesset Members from religious parties, 
Yigal Bibi (Mafdal) and Shlomo Benizri (Shas), criticized the Supreme 
Court and in particular Judge Barak. Bibi titled the situation “judicial 
dictatorship.” MK Benizri stated that “the HCJ’s judgments, Barak’s 
judgments, contradict the spirit of the Jewish Halacha [Jewish Law] . . . 
These judgments create a new Israeli reality that does not accord with 
Judaism.” The reporter explained that “Vice-President Barak . . . will be, 
next summer, the President of the Court…the Shas party coexists 
nervously with the secular courts but Barak has gone too far for them. 
Today the party decided to create a broad coalition with other religious 
parties against Barak.” Aside from short excerpts from Barak’s lecture, 
the constitutional endeavor is presented through the narrow perspective 
of the struggle between the religious parties and Judge Barak.  
Though Judge Barak’s lecture was not a judgment with conflicting 
sides, commercial television’s dislike for abstract stories and its 
preference for conflict and drama are very apparent in the framing of his 
lecture.112 In media terms, a lecture on abstract, invisible concepts is 
considered boring. The world of commercial media is ruled by the fear of 
being boring and the need to be amusing at all costs.113 Thus, it is no 
wonder that, although the lecture did not focus on religious issues, it was 
covered from the political angle as a political conflict and even as a 
personal feud between the religious parties and Barak. For example, MK 
Benizri speaks of Judge Barak as if he is the Court. 
Only two items covered the hearing and judgment in the Bank 
Hamizrchai114 case, the “Israeli Marbury v. Madison,”115 in which the 
  
 111. Israel Herzberg, Pinchas Merinsky & Yiron Pestinger, “I Spoke of a 
Constitutional Revolution to Draw Attention”, THE LAWYER, May 1996, at 11, 18 
(interviewing President Barak). 
 112. Cf. SLOTNICK & SEGAL, supra note 54, at 110-16, 234-35 (describing the 
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 113. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, ON TELEVISION 2-3 (1996). 
 114. CA 6821/93, supra note 103. 
 115. RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 142 (2011). 
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Court adopted the “constitutional revolution” thesis (items 27469-94 
from 11.27.94 and item 25629-95 from 11.9.95).116 Moreover, while four 
minutes and twenty seconds were dedicated to an item covering the 
important petition in Ayoub (1978)117 during the 1970s (item 10243-78 
from 11.23.78), only two and a half minutes were dedicated to the Bank 
Hamizrchai case’s more than three-hundred pages long judgment (item 
25629-95 from 11.9.95). The situation became even more dire in 1997, 
when the Court, for the first time, declared that, in the Bureau for 
Investment Advisors,118 a provision in a law was unconstitutional since it 
violated Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Channel One dedicated a 
total of only thirty seconds to this important precedent (item 16869-97 
from 9.24.97).119 The scarce coverage of these two important 
constitutional judgments only emphasizes that during the mid-1990s 
television hardly gave prominence to this important constitutional 
development concocted by the Court. The coverage of the Court was 
  
 116. The scarce coverage of the judgment phase in this case may be explained by 
the proximity between the day the judgment was published and Prime Minister Rabin’s 
assassination (11.4.95). However, the timing for publishing this important judgment was 
dictated by President Shamgar’s date of retirement. President Shamgar, who gave one of 
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judgments after retirement. In an interview, Aharon Barak denied the idea that the 
judgment was given at that period in order to avoid media coverage and referred to 
Shamgar’s retirement as the sole reason for the timing of the judgment. See ARIEL L. 
BENDOR & ZEEV SEGAL, THE HAT MAKER 24 (2009). Shamgar’s retirement may explain 
the flood of other important and controversial judgments, in which Shamgar took part, 
published days after the assassination. HCJ 1031/93 Pessaro (Goldstein) et al. v. Minister 
of the Interior 49(4) PD 661 [1995] (Isr.); F.H.H.C. 4466/94 Nusseiba v. Minister of Fin., 
49(4) PD 68 (Isr.); F.H.Cr.A. 2316/95 Ganimat v. Israel 39(4) PD 589 [1995] (Isr.). No 
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11.8.95. HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense 49(4) PD 94 [1995] (Isr.). In Miller, 
the Court ordered the Israeli Defense Forces not to disqualify female candidates for the 
posts of combat pilots based on their gender. Id. It is puzzling why the Court chose to 
publish such a controversial and important judgment only days after the assassination 
when the public’s attention was almost totally un-attentive to the Court. 
 117. HCJ 606/78 Ayoub v. Minister of Defense 33(2) PD 113 [1978] (Isr.). 
 118. HCJ 1715/97 Bureau for Inv. Advisors v. Minister of Fin. 51(4) PD 367 
[1997] (Isr.). 
 119. In addition to the coverage of the judgment in this case, the oral hearing was 
also covered in one item. 
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extensive in that period but focused on its involvement in issues that 
were at the center of political debate.  
However, it should be noted that both the item covering the oral 
argument and the item covering the judgment in the Bank Hamizrchai 
case120 were focused on the constitutional issue (items 27469-94 from 
11.27.94 (oral argument) and 25629-95 from 11.9.95 (judgment)). The 
reporter asserts in both items the constitutional importance of the case 
and the extended panel of judges. In the item covering the judgment, the 
reporter states that the judgment is a “precedent,” anchoring the Court’s 
authority of judicial review of legislation and asserting that “the Basic 
Laws of the Knesset are like a constitution.” Two professors, who were 
invited along with others by President Barak to interpret the judgment for 
the media, stress the importance of the judgment and that it confirms that 
a “constitutional revolution” did occur.121 Only towards the end of the 
item covering the judgment does the reporter add a sentence regarding 
the conflict “over the authorities of the courts vis-a’-vis the Knesset.” 
MK Bibi is interviewed and claims that “the Supreme Court took for 
itself the authority of a constitutional court. In that, I think, it defied the 
balance between the Knesset and the Court.” MK Bibi adds that he 
proposed a bill to change the situation by establishing a new 
constitutional court “like in Europe.” The reporter ends the item saying: 
“Judge Barak answers in the judgment: the role of a judge is to guard the 
constitution and to protect human rights.”  
At the time in which a discussion of the Court’s judicial review 
authority was most relevant, the issue was scarcely covered and when it 
was covered, the Court’s new authority to interfere with the majority will 
was brushed away in television coverage. During those years, most 
constitutional scholars did not contest the constitutional revolution’s 
normative legitimacy in the public discourse.122 When Professor Ruth 
  
 120. CA 6821/93, supra note 103. 
 121. Professor Klein says that “for every jurist this is an historical day.” Doctor 
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Gavison, who was for many years the sole voice in the academia to 
question the legitimacy of the revolution in public discourse, dared to 
utter her critique in a 1999 public interview, she was heavily criticized 
by other law professors.123 Professor Daniel Friedmann, who in 2007 
would be appointed to the position of minister of justice partly because 
of his fierce critique of the Court’s “creation of a constitution for Israel 
out of nothing,”124 came to the defense of the Court. In a letter to the 
editor in reaction to Gavison’s interview, Friedmann wrote that  
criticizing the Supreme Court’s adjudication is one thing. But to speak 
in the name of the values of the Ultra-Orthodox, as Professor Ruth 
Gavison did, and to put them on the same plain with the values adopted 
by the Knesset and developed and implemented by the Court, is a 
completely different thing.125 
A number of scholars attributed the change in the way Israelis 
imagine the Court to the “constitutional revolution.” For example, in 
1999 Menachem Hofnung argued that the 1992 Basic Laws have “caused 
the courts to be publicly perceived as partisan actors in the political arena 
whereas previously they were identified as neutral.”126 In 1998, Dan 
Avnon argued that, as a result of anchoring the “Jewish and Democratic” 
formula in the 1992 Basic Laws, the Court had to identify with a certain 
political philosophy. Subsequently, because of the “constitutional 
revolution,” the public began to perceive the Court not as a neutral expert 
but as a politically biased institution.127 Ran Hirschl is more ambiguous. 
In 2004, after public support for the Court had already plunged in public 
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opinion polls, Hirschl was careful in attributing the erosion in the Court’s 
image as “an autonomous and politically impartial arbiter” to the 1992 
constitutional revolution. Well aware that this shift in public perception 
of the Court cannot be attributed to its relatively non-salient activity of 
judicial review of legislation, Hirschl chose his words carefully. He 
wrote that “the negative impact of the judicialization of politics on the 
Supreme Court’s legitimacy is already beginning to show its mark.”128 
The “judicialization of politics” began in Israel before 1992 and thus 
hinders Hirschl’s thesis that puts emphasis on the legislation of 1992 
Basic Laws as it focal point.129 Thus, Hirschl does not attribute the 
change in the Court’s image to the 1992 “constitutional revolution.” He 
writes that as a result of the Court’s authority to review “political 
arrangements and public policies agreed upon in majoritarian decision-
making arenas” (i.e. decisions and decrees by the executive rather than 
solely legislation), “the Court and its judges are increasingly viewed by a 
considerable portion of the Israeli public as pushing forward their own 
political agenda, one identified primarily with the secular-liberal sector 
of Israeli society.”130  
The data presented show that the change in the Court’s public image 
that occurred in television coverage between 1993 and 1996 was not 
triggered by the constitutional revolution. The amount of coverage 
dedicated to the constitutional revolution was scarce. Moreover, the 
Court’s mythical image was starting to crumble between 1993 and 1996 
not due to criticism of the judges’ authority to review legislation but 
mostly due to criticism of the Court’s involvement in politics in items 
unrelated to its new founded constitutional authority. The transformation 
of the Court into a political institution in the public mind was made 
through “low politics” and not through issues of “fundamental politics,” 
such as the definition of the state as Jewish and democratic that was 
anchored in the 1992 Basic Laws. While salient judgments such as 
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Qa’adan,131 given in the early 2000s, may have caused further damage to 
the Court’s perception as a neutral body because of its intervention in 
issues of fundamental politics, the initial shattering of its mythical image 
was achieved by presenting it as involved in low politics.  
VI. SUPER CASES 
Super cases are cases that “met television’s criteria for coverage . . .  
[and] thus . . . received extensive coverage.”132 Yet to be super is a 
relative thing. As opposed to the era before the 1990s, between 1993 and 
1996, in an age of such extensive coverage of the Court, many cases 
received extensive coverage. I will focus only on three super cases and 
two additional cases that provide an interesting comparison to the era 
before the entrance of Channel Two.  
The first super case, the judgment ordering the prime minister to 
dismiss his Interior Minister Aryeh Deri presents one of the most 
dramatic clashes between the Court and the prime minister in Israel’s 
history. The judgment was given just before the entrance of Channel 
Two, and its coverage thus provides a very interesting point of 
comparison. The second case is a civil appeal. In my previous Article, I 
argued that the political aspect of civil and criminal appeals is more 
concealed and thus their coverage is less prone to damage the Court’s 
mythical image.133 Yet, for exactly this reason in the age of commercial 
television, these cases should be less attractive for television coverage. 
Two appeals received extensive coverage between 1993 and 1996. The 
first was the criminal appeal of the Nazi criminal John Ivan Demjanjuk 
which is discussed later in the Article.134 The second was the civil appeal 
and further hearing in the Nachmani Frozen Eggs case. By examining the 
coverage of this civil appeal that is unconnected to the political arena, we 
may be able to better distill the prism through which the media covered 
the Court. The third super case was the Bar-Ilan Road controversy, the 
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most-covered case during the period discussed in my Article. The 
judgment in the case was given only in 1997, but in order to have a full 
picture of the controversy, I analyze its coverage until the 1997 final 
judgment.  
In addition, I have chosen to examine two judgments, given in 1994 
and 1996 that address the disqualification of non-Orthodox Jews from 
serving in religious municipal councils. Though these judgments did not 
receive extensive coverage, I have chosen them since they allow us to 
draw an effective comparison with the coverage of a similar case from 
1987 in which a petition was submitted against the disqualification of a 
woman from serving in a religious municipal council. The results in all 
three cases are similar as the Court forbade these disqualifications. Thus, 
the comparison between the cases allows me to better isolate the 
influence of Channel Two’s entrance into the arena. 
1. On the Cusp of Change: Deri (1993) 
In 1993, in the Eisenberg judgment, the HCJ disqualified Mr. Yossi 
Ginnosar from the appointment as the Director General of the Ministry 
of Building and Housing.135 The Eisenberg judgment was the first in a 
long strand of judgments disqualifying candidates from the appointment 
of candidates to high public office and ordering the resignation of 
serving public officials based on the doctrine of “unreasonableness.” The 
judgment was titled by academic commentators as a “landmark case” and 
a “blatant example of judicial activism.”136 However, it was covered only 
in one item (item 4953-93 from 3.23.93).  
A few months later, in two of its most activist decisions to date, the 
HCJ ordered the prime minister to dismiss two government members (a 
minister and a deputy minister) against whom an indictment had been 
issued for bribery and fraud.137 On the day the decisions were given, the 
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coverage focused on the case that dealt with Minister of the Interior 
Aryeh Deri.138 In total, the petition concerning Deri was covered in 
thirteen items. The reason for the extensive coverage is clear: the 
dismissal of Deri, the chairman of the powerful Shas Mizrahi ultra-
Orthodox party, would influence the government’s stability and thus the 
entire political arena. Indeed, in hindsight, some argue that Shas would 
have remained part of the coalition had Deri remained a minister. 
Gavison even goes so far as to claim that had the Court avoided giving 
this decision, Prime Minister Rabin’s assassination might have been 
prevented since with Shas in the government, the Oslo accords would 
have enjoyed greater legitimacy among the Jewish public.139 As was 
apparent in the 1970s and 1980s, whenever the Court appears as a player 
in a highly controversial political dispute, it is covered extensively.140 
The more prominent the affair in the political debate, the more extensive 
the coverage.  
The coverage given to the judgment in Deri’s case was very much in 
line with the coverage given to the Court’s interventions in partisan 
politics between 1990 and 1991.141 In the items covering the judgment, 
almost all of the reactions praise the Court and emphasize its struggle 
against corruption. Even the lawyer who represented Deri only mildly 
criticized the Court by wondering whether the Court is not “positing 
itself above the Knesset.” The reporter ended the report from the Court 
saying that “the Court deepened today its reach into the domain of the 
executive branch and put its hand on the government’s table so as to 
enforce the rule of law there. The law is the ruler of the land and the 
Supreme Court showed today who enforces it.” (item 17738-93, from 
9.8.93). Even the item covering the reactions from the Deri camp does 
not contain any criticism of the Court, only a discussion of the way ahead 
in terms of Shas’s place in the coalition (item 17739-93, from 9.8.93). 
Indeed, television coverage of the Deri judgment very much conformed 
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to the mythical image as it presented the Court as the last bastion against 
the corruption of the political system.142  
And yet there were two exceptions to the presentation through the 
mythical prism. First, in the item covering jurists’ reactions, Professor 
Ruth Gavison criticized the judgment saying that the Court’s decision to 
compel the prime minister to dismiss Deri is “problematic . . . dangerous 
and almost impossible . . .” (item 17740-93 from 9.8.93). Second, Prime 
Minister Rabin reacted in an interview to the Court’s criticism in the 
judgment regarding his refusal to exercise his discretionary power of 
removal saying that while he supports the rule of law, “he is accountable 
to the voters and not to anyone else.” (item 17741-93 from 9.8.93).  
Before the judgment, television covered the prospects for the 
coalition, and for the peace process if the Court compelled the prime 
minister to dismiss Deri (item 16324-93, from 8.19.93; item 17160-93, 
from 8.30.93). These items were prepared by political reporters rather 
than by the legal one. While the items covering the hearings in the case, 
prepared by the legal reporter, presented the controversy from the angle 
of the State Attorney’s difficulty in presenting Prime Minister Rabin’s 
position before the Court in view of the State Attorney’s conflicting legal 
position (items 15603-93, from 8.10.93; 16324-93, from 8.19.93; 17161-
93, from 8.30.93), the items prepared by political reporters dealt with the 
same controversy from the low-politics angle. They discussed Rabin’s 
anger toward the Attorney General and the possibility that the Attorney 
General would be sacked. Very few references were made in the political 
items on the criteria by which the Court would decide the case. 
Comments made by the judges during the hearings were quoted in these 
items solely as hints of the possible results of the petitions, without 
bringing any of the legal reasoning given to support them (i.e., President 
Shamgar alluded that Deri will need to resign etc.). The connection was 
immediately made between the comment and the influence a possible 
result would have on the political arena (item 17160-93, from 8.30.93). 
While the Court was not criticized, even by Shas’ representatives, it was 
presented in the items focused on the political arena as just another 
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player in the political domain whose decisions would affect the 
government’s ability to survive, as well as the peace process. The ability 
to cover the Court through the political angle fitted well with television’s 
biases,143 and as the Court supplied more occasions for coverage of its 
involvement in the political arena, it also undermined its image as 
detached from politics.  
2. The Nachmani Frozen Eggs Judgments (1995-96) 
Ruthie and Danny Nachmani started a process of in vitro fertilization 
after Ruthie’s womb had been removed due to cancer. The couple 
fertilized eleven of Ruthie’s eggs with Danny’s sperm and froze the 
embryos for future use. Several years into the process, after having 
already signed an agreement with a center for surrogacy based in the 
United States, Danny left the marital home for another woman, with 
whom he had two daughters. He refused to let Ruthie continue on her 
own with the process of finding a surrogate to carry the fertilized eggs. 
Ruthie filed a lawsuit to obtain the embryos. The trial judge held that 
Danny breached his agreement with his wife. Since he had already 
fertilized Ruthie’s eggs, he could not withdraw his agreement to have a 
child with her. A five-judge panel of the Supreme Court reversed the 
ruling, in a 4 to 1 decision, and held that Danny had a fundamental right 
not to be forced to be a parent and that the agreement was unenforceable 
because the originally-contemplated performance was now impossible.144 
An eleven-judge panel of the Supreme Court, the largest panel ever in 
that period, reheard the appeal. On September 1996 the seven judges in 
the majority reversed the decision of the five-judge panel and awarded 
the embryos to Ruthie. They found that no statutes or precedents applied 
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to this case and decided that the harm to Ruthie outweighed the harm to 
Danny.145 
The Nachmani affair was covered in eight items, a very unusual 
amount for civil appeals. But in view of the dramatic ingredients of this 
affair, the extensive coverage is not surprising.146 The case presented a 
conflict between a husband and a wife, offered a clear-cut decision on 
matters of life and death and dealt with a highly emotional issue. In 
addition, the Court’s decision offered a fierce controversy between the 
judges. All these ingredients made the Nachmani affair extremely 
attractive for television coverage.147  
The legal academy acknowledged that the Court’s decisions were 
value-based, and Dapahna Barak-Erez even mildly criticized the Court 
for its attempt to conceal the value-laden basis of its first decision (the 
judgment on the appeal) and present its decision as value-neutral.148 
David Heyd emphasized the difficulty of being able to discern between 
the moral aspect and the legal aspect in the Court’s final judgment.149 
Several of the judges indeed referred to this difficulty in their judgment. 
Judge Goldberg noted that “[t]his dispute does not essentially fall within 
the framework of an existing legal norm . . . It lies entirely in the realm 
of emotion, morality, sociology and philosophy. This explains the 
normative void and the inability of accepted legal rules to provide a 
solution to the dispute.”150 Judge Türkel added that “objectivity, in a case 
like ours . . . is a myth and nothing more.”151 
The coverage on Channel One presented the Court as moving from a 
decision based on the law in the appeal phase to a decision based on 
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morality in the further hearing phase. Danny’s lawyer said in one of the 
items covering the judgment in the appeal that the Court’s ruling is 
“undoubtedly the victory of logic over emotions.” (items 9703-95, 9702-
95 from 3.30.95). In an item broadcast a day before the decision in the 
further hearing phase was given, the reporter, Michael Doron, noted that 
the decision is “a philosophical-legal dilemma but above all a moral 
dilemma.” (item 21953-96, from 9.11.96).  
The coverage of the Court’s final judgment in the affair opened the 
news edition. The report on the decision and the following discussion in 
the studio afterwards carried on for almost seven minutes. The report 
asserted: “today begins also a new day at the Supreme Court with some 
question marks. Did the judges get carried away by their feelings? Did 
their hearts go out to Ruthie Nachmani, swept by public sympathy?” 
Judge Türkel is presented as “new to this panel of judges and to this 
Court.” On the screen, the following part of his judgment is quoted: “the 
result I have reached is not merely the result of legal analysis but also of 
intuition and internal feeling.”152 The majority decision is presented as 
based on emotion: “the majority thought that they should support 
parenting, support life and took into consideration that this is Ruthie’s 
last chance to become a mother.” Immediately afterwards, and in contrast 
to the majority, the reporter notes that Judge Zamir’s minority opinion is 
based on the “fertilization law.” The reporter presents the sharp 
controversy between the minority and the majority and adds that “Judge 
Zamir, in the minority as well, fiercely criticizes his colleagues.” (item 
22268-96, from 9.12.96). 
Objectivity and decisions according to legal criteria were central parts 
of the Court’s mythical image. Until 1993, the Court was presented as an 
“empire of law, and not of men.”153 Yet the Nachmani majority judgment 
was presented as based not on the law, but on emotions. The coverage 
might have depicted accurately the Court’s ruling in the sense that the 
majority judgment in the further hearing phase relied heavily on the 
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notion of justice, while the minority focused on the law.154 Yet it is quite 
startling to see how even in a civil case in which the “legal algorithms”155 
are supposed to be more apparent in coverage than in the coverage of 
petitions to the HCJ,156 the mythical image has been eroded. The decision 
in the further hearing was not presented as a result of objective legal 
expertise but as a struggle between the judges. Moreover, the Court’s 
image as standing above public opinion was eroded by the report’s 
rhetorical question of whether the judges were “swept away by public 
sympathy.” 
3. Religious Councils (1994, 1996) 
In 1987, the Court ruled in Shakdiel that female candidates could not 
be disqualified from membership in religious councils based on their 
gender.157 As the coverage showed, the ruling fueled criticism of the 
Court from the religious establishment. Yet, at least in their covered 
reaction, the critics did not doubt the judges’ motives or raise complaints 
about their political affiliation. They “expressed sorrow” over the ruling 
(reaction read by the anchor following item 5994-88, from 5.19.1988) 
and in an official statement by the Chief Rabbinate of Israel the council 
called the judgment “an unjustified intervention by a secular tribunal in 
religious life in Israel.” The council expressed “its utmost protest” (item 
6336-88, from 5.30.88). However, the reporter noted that the “Chief 
Rabbis contest the claim that in their critique of the secular legal system 
they challenge its authority, on the contrary.” When the reporter asked 
the Sephardi Chief Rabbi, Mordechai Eliyahu, whether their statement 
was not a “declaration of war,” Rabbi Eliyahu reacted by asking “why?” 
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but stressed that in his view the only way to resolve the crisis was for the 
HCJ to back off. The Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi, Avraham Shapira, 
explained the council reaction by noting that in “the Halacha [Jewish 
law] only rabbis decide and not those who are not people of Halacha.”  
In 1994, the Court ruled in Hoffman158 that when choosing 
representatives to the Religious Council, the Local Council could not 
disqualify a candidate for membership simply because she belonged to 
the Reform or Conservative movements of Judaism (most practicing 
religious Jews in Israel identify themselves with the Orthodox branch). 
The reporter noted that in the religious councils “there are preparations 
for battle, for them this is a matter of be killed but do not transgress. The 
members of the religious councils threaten to resign the moment the first 
Reform candidate is nominated to the council.” In this spirit, Arye 
Gamlieal (Shas), the Deputy Minister of Religious Services, condemned 
the judgment and stressed that he will not sign the required documents 
for fulfilling the ruling, “even if I have to resign.” (item 2453-94, from 
1.26.94). Less than a month later, television showed a meeting of the 
religious councils’ heads with the two Chief Rabbis, assembled in order 
to decide how to react to the Court’s ruling. Their decision was in 
essence to defy the ruling by refusing to sit together with non-Orthodox 
representatives. The conservative movement’s reaction, read by the 
anchor, called the Orthodox representatives to stop their “subversive” 
action against the Court’s authority (item 4549-94, from 22.2.94). 
The religious councils indeed refused de-facto to comply with the 
Hoffman ruling.159 As a result, in 1996, the Court ruled again in Naot160 
that religious non-Orthodox candidates could not be disqualified from 
membership in religious councils based on their “world view.”161 Again, 
the reactions by the Rabbis in the item covering the judgment were much 
harsher in comparison to the Shakdiel judgment.  
The HCJ ordered the Jerusalem City Council to elect new 
representatives in a manner that ensured the election of non-Orthodox 
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candidates. Rabbi Meir Porush, an Orthodox member of the Jerusalem 
City Council, said in reaction that “with all due respect to Supreme Court 
judges, my hand will be cut off before [voting for non-Orthodox 
candidates] and I will not raise my hand to promote Reforms and 
Conservatives. For me this simply cannot happen.” (item 3748-96, from 
1.1.96). The reporter then added that “this is another battle in the war of 
the Religious people on the authority of the Supreme Court.” Later in the 
item the reporter asked Jerusalem’s Chief Rabbi Yitzchak Kolitz whether 
he would sit with Reform and Conservative representatives. Kolitz 
answered: “they will not sit here.” Haifa’s Chief Rabbi She’ar Yashuv 
Cohen was then interviewed in the studio by the anchorman, Haim 
Yavin. Yavin kept interrupting Cohen’s attempt to explain the 
complexity of his position demanding that he answer one question: will 
he will obey the Court’s judgment. At one point Yavin tries to 
summarize the interview saying that “it seems to me that the headline of 
our conversation is that you will obey the HCJ’s ruling.” Yet Cohen 
resisted Yavin’s attempt to capture his position in a soundbite and 
stressed: “I did not say that.” (item 3749-96, from 1.1.96). No doubt the 
tone of the items was milder because of the atmosphere after the 
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, which had occurred only two 
months earlier. Some of the speakers did indeed make a connection 
between the reactions to the judgment and the lessons of the 
assassination. Yet, two of the Rabbis still openly declared that they 
would not comply with the Court’s ruling.  
4. The Bar-Ilan Road Controversy (1996-1997) 
In 1996, the Court held multiple hearings in petitions against the 
Central Traffic Authority regulation to partially ban vehicular traffic on a 
major road in Jerusalem (the Bar-Ilan road) during the hours of prayer on 
the Jewish Sabbath.162 The road was a thorough-fare connecting the 
northern entrance to Jerusalem with its northern neighborhoods and 
traversed an area heavily populated by ultra-Orthodox.163 While the final 
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judgment in the case was given only in 1997, the hearings and interim 
decisions of the Court were covered in eighteen items during 1996 
(19.4% of the total items broadcast in 1996). In its final judgment the 
Court ruled in favor of the petitioners who challenged the decision to 
close the road. It vacated the decision and remanded the issue to the 
Minister of Transp. However, the four majority judges found that closing 
the road could be reasonable as long as an arrangement was made for the 
secular minority living in the ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods. Throughout 
the period in which the case was adjudicated, violent mass 
demonstrations of ultra-Orthodox, became a frequent event on the road 
and in its vicinity. To a much lesser extent, seculars demonstrated on the 
road as well.164  
The coverage presented the affair as a struggle between religious 
residents (especially ultra-Orthodox) and secular residents of Jerusalem 
that was decided by the Court in favor of the secular side. While the 
secular speakers, all of whom were affiliated with leftist parties, gave 
complimented the Court and promised to honor its decisions all 
throughout the process of litigation (item 20309-96 and 20310-96, from 
8.15.96; item 19850-96, from 8.10.96), the religious politicians and the 
rabbis spoke in a completely different tone. The Deputy Mayor of 
Jerusalem at that time, Rabbi Chaim Miller, noted after one of the 
hearings at the HCJ that he had “concerns the Court have become a 
branch of Meretz [a leftist party] and we should take this under 
advisement.” (item 18269-96, from 7.12.96). Deputy Minister Yigal Bibi 
spoke of a “judicial dictatorship that does not exist anywhere else. Who 
chose them to determine this? There is a chosen municipality, a chosen 
transportation Minister, so they [the HCJ] need to decide?” MK Shaul 
Yahalom (National Religious Party), who served at that time as the 
chairperson of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the 
Knesset, commented that the Court “oversteps its judicial role and begins 
to set norms and values and this is the role of the democratic system.” 
Deputy Minister Meir Porush (United Torah Judaism) expressed his 
distrust of the Court by cynically suggesting the adoption of American 
mediation for the Bar-Ilan controversy as was done in Hebron in that 
period in Al-Shuhada Street. He further raised the option of what is 
  
 164. See id. at 103-05. 
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nicknamed “a law by-passing Bagatz,” i.e., a law that would overturn the 
HCJ’s ruling.  
Minister of Transport Yitzhak Levy (National Religious Party), who 
also served during that period as a member of the judicial selection 
committee, was extremely careful in his reaction to the final judgment. 
As the minister entrusted to implement the HCJ judgment in the 
following months, he promised to “study the judgment” in order to close 
the street during times of prayer without defying the Court’s decision. 
The reporter asked him whether more religious judges on the Court 
would have made a difference. Levy refused to answer the question “at 
this point in time” but the reporter added that at the meeting of all 
religious MKs convened in the wake of the decision, “many said that it is 
about time to implement the election results in the Supreme Court so that 
its composition will properly reflect the percentage of religious people in 
Israel. In the meantime, the religious representatives promise that the 
HCJ’s decision is only a temporary victory for seculars.” (item 8883-97, 
from 4.13.97).  
Unlike in earlier periods, the reporters interviewed not only the parties 
involved in the case, politicians and rabbis, but also passers-by on the 
Bar-Ilan road. This decision to solicit reactions to the Court’s decisions 
from people “on the street” had a grave influence on the tone of 
coverage, since the ultra-Orthodox interviewees tended to be more 
dramatic in their reactions as well as much blunter in their accusations 
against the Court. One person called the Court “anti-religious,” another 
one promised that “blood will be spilled on the street” (item 20310-96, 
from 8.15.96); another person stated his intention to defy the decision by 
lying on the road (item 8884-97, from 4.13.97). In one item, the reporter 
noted that Bar-Ilan residents said that for them, “the Bagaz [the HCJ] 
does not exist, it is a branch of Meretz, for them it is only the Badaz [the 
ultra-Orthodox community’s tribunal].” (item 19391-96, from 8.3.96). 
While ultra-Orthodox Israelis were probably never among the Court’s 
admirers,165 the exposure of their deep animosity toward the Court to the 
non-ultra-Orthodox audience was new in television coverage. My claim 
is not that exposure of their critique had any persuasive power on non-
  
 165. They were under-represented in many of the public opinion polls that 
demonstrated a high level of public support for the Court. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 
318 n. 49. 
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ultra-Orthodox Israelis. My point is that due to the visibility given to 
their reactions, the Court lost its status in coverage as an institution that 
is beyond and above the political debate. Criticism against it was uttered 
now in the same language and in the same manner as against other 
players in the political arena. This change in the Court’s image was of 
serious importance. Since the 1980s it was clear to any reader of the 
Court’s judgments that it is an avid supporter, if not the leader, of Israel’s 
secular-liberal camp.166 Yet, until 1993, the Court paid no price in terms 
of its image as being positioned above politics even when it directly 
interfered in the political arena.167 The loss of its status as a neutral 
arbitrator in the public-mind – a status vital for its institutional 
legitimacy168 – occurred only after the entrance of Channel Two. Only 
then did the Court’s portrayal in the Israeli social imaginary shift.  
Moreover, television did not describe the controversy in distinct legal 
terms. The coverage did not present the Court as an expert. Judges were 
not depicted as deciding the case based on their superior knowledge in 
the legal domain. Indeed, the framing of the Court as just another 
political institution, an institution that was directed by the judges’ 
ideological or even partisan orientation had become so ingrained that, 
without flinching, the reporter asked the minister of transport about the 
appointment of more religious judges to the Court. The framing of the 
Court as an apolitical institution directed solely be legal expertise was no 
longer in control. Many scholars argue that expertise is the firmest basis 
  
 166. See MAUTNER, supra note 17, at 144 (“The Court, then, joined the Jewish-
secular-liberal group . . . and cooperated with them closely and consistently to defend the 
values of Western liberalism they shared in common by making the Court a significant 
venue for promoting that group’s values and positions.”). 
 167. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 351-53 (“These examples of the Court’s activism 
and involvement in the heated political struggle had the potential to undermine the 
Court’s mythical image . . . . However, the mythical image was so persistent that instead 
the Court’s actions were presented as apolitical, standing in direct contrast with the 
wheeling and dealing of the political arena.”). 
 168. See GAVISON, KREMNITZER & DOTAN, supra note 5, at 275 (arguing that a 
belief in the Court’s neutrality is essential for its institutional “capital”); Tyler & 
Mitchell, supra note 95, at 713-14 (arguing in the context of the American Supreme 
Court that “[t]he data analyzed support the argument made by the Justices in Casey (as 
well as by legal scholars such as Fiss) that perceptions of political neutrality bear an 
important relationship to Court legitimacy.”). 
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for both the normative and sociological legitimacy of courts.169 True, in 
one item the reporter mentions the Court’s suggestion for compromise: 
opening a road in another nearby street that was closed for Shabat, while 
closing the Bar-Ilan road (item 4656-97, from 1.12.97). Yet this kind of 
suggestion does not reflect any legal expertise.  
Perhaps most interestingly, the coverage presented the judgment as a 
defeat for religious Israelis. While the Court did decide to overrule the 
regulation to close the road, it left the minister of transport the option to 
reissue the regulation to close the road once an arrangement for secular 
residents was provided. This path was indeed taken.170 Television failed 
almost completely to present this complexity. The minister of transport 
was the only one who explicitly discussed this option in the items 
covering the affair (one of the reporters alluded to this option in item 
8882-97, from 4.13.97). Thus, the Court may have intended in its Horev 
judgment to “lower the stakes of politics” by using balancing to 
transform a “dispute that was viewed as a bitter cultural war and a matter 
of fundamental principle into a simple trade off that most reasonable 
people would accept.”171 But this line of thought did not comply with 
commercial television’s biases and thus at least Channel One failed to 
spread this message. 
The tendency of commercial media to prefer dramatic decisions with 
clear winners and losers led to simplistic coverage. The legal language 
game was neglected in television coverage and replaced by the political 
language game that better fits televisions’ biases as a medium. Television 
  
 169. See, e.g., RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN 
DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY 87 (2007) (“Judges do not derive 
their authority from being modern Solomons. Rather, they are expected to be experts on, 
and impartial appliers of, the law.”); Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law 
/ Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of 
Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1507-09 (2007) (explaining that the central 
premise of the legal process jurisprudence “is that faithful compliance with professional 
norms is in the long run the best hope for legitimating the legal system.”); Or Bassok, The 
Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 333, 343-50 (2012) 
(surveying various interpretative approaches that offered solutions to the 
countermajoritarian difficulty based on judicial expertise).  
 170. ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 163, at 106 (describing the developments following 
the judgment). 
 171. See Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of 
Justification, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 470-71 (2011). 
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that functions according to its biases, rather than “a televised 
newspaper,” favors more inclusive and participational language and thus 
may erode in its coverage any claim to authority based on an expert 
knowledge.172 This was a complete shift from the era until 1992 when the 
Court was presented as a legal expert deciding highly political 
controversies according to a professional apolitical criterion.173 
VII. SURVIVING REMNANTS OF THE MYTHICAL IMAGE  
1. Petitions Made by Bereaved Families 
In the coverage of petitions submitted by bereaved families the 
mythical image of the Court was alive and well in television coverage 
between 1993 and 1996. Though most of the petitions covered were 
dismissed by the Court, the families did not present any claim that the 
Court was politicized or biased in favor of the military.  
The first item covering a petition submitted by a bereaved family was 
broadcast in December 1992 (the Yismach case174; item 20617-92, from 
12.3.92). However, the relatively extended coverage began in 1994. 
Scholars who have analyzed the “politics of bereavement” claim that 
following the training accidents of 1991-1992, the families’ struggle 
started to change. The families “adopted an unanticipated model of 
behavior: they petitioned directly to the Supreme Court.”175 The media 
played a crucial role in this change. Mabat covered petitions that dealt 
with the criminal trials of commanders involved in training accidents. It 
also covered, among others, a family’s petition to add the names of a 
soldier’s siblings to his uniform headstone in the military cemetery (The 
Wechselbaum cases176; items 26069-94, from 12.4.94; 9339-95, from 
3.27.95), and a petition challenging the promotion of an officer to the 
position of Commander of the IDF’s Officers School based on his 
  
 172. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 82 (1995). 
 173. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 358. 
 174. HCJ 4353/92 Yismach v. The Attorney General (unpublished) (Isr.). 
 175. Udi Lebel, Cracks in the Mirror of Military Hegemony: The Courts and the 
Media as Agents of Civil Society, in PUBLIC POLICY IN ISRAEL: PERSPECTIVES AND 
PRACTICES 205 (Dani Korn ed., 2002). 
 176. HCJ 5688/92 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defense 47(2) PD 812 [1992] 
(Isr.); A.H. 3299/93 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defense 49(2) PD 195 [1995] (Isr.). 
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alleged responsibility for a soldier’s death during a routine military 
practice (The Shoshan case177; items 18594-96, from 7.26.96; 22950-96, 
from 9.25.96; 25307-96, from 10.27.96; 25745-96, from 11.6.96). 
The coverage of these petitions presented the Court’s hearings in a 
very detailed manner. Offers by the judges for compromises were 
presented in several of the items (items 13976-94, from 6.17.94; 1603-
97, from 12.5.96; 23832-96, from 10.10.96). The Court’s image in these 
items is of an institution that is highly sensitive to the families’ emotional 
demands but knows how to balance these demands with Israel’s security 
needs. Though the families were at times critical of the Supreme Court, 
the coverage of their reactions presented a contrast between the unjust 
military system (including military courts) and the just Supreme Court 
(see for example, item 27642-94 from 11.30.94). 
Even though the Court has devoted serious attention to petitions by 
bereaved families, the legal academy has yet to devote attention to these 
petitions as a distinct category since most of the Court’s decisions do not 
contain any distinct legal doctrines that necessitate a separate analysis.178 
However, as for the relationship between the media and the Court, this 
category is unique. In the items covering the families’ petitions, 
television continued to present the Court as a consensual institution, the 
last bastion trusted by families who have lost their faith in “the system.” 
But television did more. It presented the Court not only as the last legal 
forum for the families to raise their grievances, but also as the 
“campfire” of Israeli society where the claims of the families were 
addressed. In this spirit, a lawyer who represented a bereaved family 
whose son was killed by “friendly fire,” stated after the Court’s oral 
hearing: “the story of a needless, mistaken death of a person needs to be 
told in some public arena, in a public forum where everyone comes and 
perhaps there is some kind of catharsis that the story is told and the 
factual questions are discussed and there is a final factual determination 
of what happened, who is to blame, what is the responsibility of each 
party.” (item 12436-95 from 5.1.96). This function of the Court as 
  
 177. HCJ 4537/96 Shoshan v. Chief of the General Staff, 50(4) PD 416 [1996]. 
 178. But see Ran Hirschl, Civil Society v. The State of Israel: Two Conceptual 
Notions in Current Discussion on Civil Society and their Place in the Supreme Court 
Adjudication, in ISRAEL: FROM MOBILIZED TO CIVIL SOCIETY? 305, 325-27 (Yoav Peled & 
Adi Ophir eds., 2001) (Isr.). 
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Israel’s campfire cannot of course be achieved unless the media covers 
these petitions.  
The judges themselves acted in these petitions in a manner very much 
in line with this vision of the Court as Israel’s campfire. On two different 
occasions, the hearing in the Shoshan case and the judgment in the 
Shafran case, the judges stated that the petitioners achieved their goal by 
stirring up a public discussion as a result of the submission of their 
petitions.179 Both sayings were covered by television (items 27642-94, 
from 11.30.94; 25307-96 from 10.27.96). 
2. Demjanjuk’s Appeal (1991-1993) 
The coverage of John Demjanjuk’s criminal appeal, which began in 
1991 and ended in 1993, closely conformed to the mythical image. The 
appeal focused on whether Demjanjuk was the guard nicknamed Ivan the 
Terrible at the Treblinka Nazi concentration camp. As crime television 
series such as Law and Order or CSI demonstrate, questions of 
identification are very suitable for commercial television. And indeed, in 
the items broadcast in preparation for the Court’s judgment, the legal 
reporter Shlomo Arad did extraordinary work in describing this narrow 
question, in a very detailed analysis of the evidence in this highly 
emotional case (items 13938-93, from 7.23.93; 14378-93 from 7.28.93). 
The availability of footage from the district court’s proceedings, which 
was filmed in its entirety, contributed to the high level of coverage; 
certain parts of the trial were shown in the items. For the first in its 
history, the Supreme Court’s reading of a small portion of the judgment 
acquitting Demjanjuk was broadcast in its entirety on live television. It 
was later reshown in Mabat (item 14605-93, from 7.29.93).180 The 
reasoning for the acquittal was not covered beyond the small portion of 
the judgment that was read, and television turned immediately to cover 
the reactions and the consequences of the judgment. Yet, in all the items, 
the Court was presented as the most qualified institution to decide the 
question. 
  
 179. HCJ 4537/96 Shoshan v. Chief of the General Staff, 50(4) PD 416; HCJ 
6009/94 Shafran v. the Chief Military Prosecutor, 48(5) PD 573 [1994] (Isr.). 
 180. CrimA 347/88 Israel v. Demjanjuk 47(4) PD 221 [1993] (Isr.). 
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After the acquittal, many speakers expressed their pride in the Court’s 
ability to provide justice for Demjanjuk, who, even according to the 
Court’s judgment, was a low-level Nazi in the Sobibor extermination 
camp. The anchorwoman quoted Justice Minister Libai’s comment that 
“the Supreme Court proved to the entire world that Jewish judges can 
conduct a fair trial in Jerusalem even of someone who was accused and 
convicted of crimes against the Jewish people.” A high-school student 
who attended the judgment’s reading said, in an interview in the Court 
building, “this shows how our legal system tries not to convict any 
innocent person even if there is only really a small doubt” (item 14605-
93, from 7.29.93). Lawyer Moshe Negbi added from the studio “this 
judgment honors the Israeli legal system.” (14608-93, from 7.29.93). In 
an item filmed in the American city where Demjanjuk lived before his 
extradition to Israel, a Jewish person interviewed noted that “nowhere in 
the world would a man have gotten more justice than in the State of 
Israel” (item 14609-93, from 7.29.93). Haim Cohen, a former Supreme 
Court judge added in another item that he was happy that the judges 
stood firm against the populist thirst to “do revenge against the Gentiles.” 
(item 14578-93, from 7.30.93). Holocaust survivors did criticize the 
Court, saying that the judges “were mistaken, they carried out an 
injustice . . . history will judge them.” (Yosef Charny in item 14605-93, 
from 7.29.93). But their voice was quite dimmed by the general tone of 
appraisal of the Court’s judgment.181  
After the acquittal, several petitions were submitted to the Court 
challenging Demjanjuk’s release from prison and the decision to deport 
him, given the Court’s explicit assertion that Demjanjuk was a Nazi 
guard at the Sobibor death camp.182 All the petitions were denied,183 but 
the hearings and decisions in these petitions received extensive coverage 
  
 181. Demjanjuk was later convicted by a German court of being an accessory to 
the murder of 28,060 Jews as a low-level Nazi at the Sobibor death camp. Demjanjuk 
died while his appeal was still pending and thus his former conviction was invalidated. 
See Karin Matussek, Demjanjuk Convicted of Helping Nazis to Murder Jews During the 
Holocaust, BLOOMBERG (May 12, 2011, 11:15 AM),  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-12/demjanjuk-convicted-of-helping-nazis-to-
murder-jews-during-the-holocaust.html. 
 182. It should be noted that the Court had the authority to convict Demjanjuk for 
different crimes than those he was indicted for. The Court explicitly rejected this option.  
 183. HCJ 4162/93 Federman v. The Attorney General 47(5) PD 309 [1993] (Isr.); 
F.H.HCJ 4757/93 Federman v. The Attorney General (unpublished). 
94 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.1  
(items 14800-93, from 8.1.93; 14965-93, from 8.14. 93, 16200-93, from 
8.18.93; 16252-93, from 8.20.93). The coverage in these items had quite 
a different tone. One of the petitioners, the extreme Right-wing activist 
Noam Federman, spoke of the Court’s desire “to look good in the eyes of 
the world.” Holocaust survivors spoke now more freely against the 
decision to release Demjanjuk, and a representative of the Wiesenthal 
Center criticized the Attorney General’s decision not to charge 
Demjanjuk for his actions in Sobibor. These items (and to a lesser extent 
the focus on reactions to the acquittal in the coverage of the judgment in 
Demjanjuk’s criminal appeal) demonstrated how commercial media’s 
biases affected the coverage.  
3. The Court’s New Building 
Until 1992, the Supreme Court was situated in a section of a Russian 
Church built in the 19th century.184 The exterior of the building, which 
today serves as the Jerusalem Peace Court, was rarely shown in 
television coverage. The building’s inner hallways and the dense 
courtroom were filmed more frequently (for example, item 14828-89, 
from 11.7.89).  
Since 1992, the Supreme Court has resided in its new dwelling 
located in the Government Complex (Kiryat HaMemshala) in Jerusalem. 
Since television could not broadcast the hearing of cases until only 
recently,185 least of all present the decision-making process, in almost 
every filmed item covering the Court during the period between 1993 
and 1996, some of the visuals presented are of the Court’s impressive 
building, the spacious hallways, the courtroom, the panel of judges 
entering the courtroom, and the judges and litigants in their seats. With 
the rise in coverage in filmed items the saliency of this footage had 
become very high. These pictures create a very different image of the 
Court than the image created by a report read by an anchor without any 
accompanying pictures. 
All ceremonial characteristics presented in these filmed reports–the 
judges and lawyers wrapped in robes; the litigants and courtroom 
  
 184. See DAVID KROYANKER, JERUSALEM ARCHITECTURE 152 (2006) (Isr.). 
 185. In September 2014, an experimental live television broadcast of important 
Court hearings has begun. Tova Zimoki, Starting from Next week: The Supreme Court 
Goes on Live Broadcast, YNET, Sept. 3, 2014 (Isr.). 
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audience standing while the judges enter the courtroom; the judges 
sitting on a podium presiding above the audience–create a mystical and 
formal atmosphere. The sense of expertise, of established order and 
deference to authority are well transmitted through such pictures.186  
People tend to trust the visual more than the verbal message.187 
Moreover, pictures tend to short-circuit introspection and logical 
reasoning.188 It is not surprising then that James Gibson and Gregory 
Caldeira conclude, based on their extensive empirical research 
examining the American public’s support for the Supreme Court, that 
“[t]o know courts is indeed to love them, in the sense that to know about 
courts is to be exposed to these legitimizing symbols.”189 They assert that 
“exposure to the legitimizing symbols of law and courts is perhaps the 
dominant process at play.”190 In this spirit the committee that made the 
decision regarding the architectural model for the Israeli Supreme 
Court’s new building noted that their criterion for selection was 
achieving equilibrium between “awe-inspiring” and “practical 
considerations.”191 There is no doubt that, since the Court moved to its 
new building, in 1992, the pictures of the Court building broadcast on 
television reflect this sense of “awe-inspiring” majesty. 
For years Gibson and Caldeira tried to establish “the theory of 
positivity bias” in order to account for how courts gain institutional 
legitimacy.192 According to their theory, “anything that causes people to 
pay attention to courts – even controversies – winds up reinforcing 
institutional legitimacy through exposure to the legitimizing symbols 
  
 186. Cf. DAVIS, supra note 69, at 12-13 (“The courtroom in which the justices sit 
in public session reinforces legitimacy and expertise . . . . The rituals of the Court act to 
perpetuate the mystique of the Court.”). 
 187. See PERI, supra note 8, at 15-16 (“[T]ELEVISION PLAYS TO THE EMOTIONS 
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 189. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, The 
Supreme Court and the US Presidential election of 2000: Wounds, Self Inflicted or 
Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 553 (2003). 
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 191. YOSEP SHARON, THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING 25 (1993). 
 192. See James L. Gibson, The Evolving Legitimacy of the South African 
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associated with law and courts.”193 Recently, they took a step back. In 
their 2009 book, they partly retracted their earlier statements and 
explained that “[i]n our earlier investigations of Court support we have 
come close to arguing that virtually anything that stimulates citizens to 
pay attention to courts enhances institutional legitimacy . . . . [W]e were 
wrong: there are indeed circumstances in which increasing exposure 
weakens legitimacy.”194 Based on the sharp decline in the support for the 
Israeli Court, I did not follow their “positivity bias” thesis in the first part 
of this project.195 Writing this Article strengthened my skepticism of this 
thesis. Legitimizing symbols have an important effect of the portrayal 
courts in television, but when the general prism through which a court is 
presented shifts they do not dominate the coverage. When the prism 
through which a court is presented is political, it is hard to see how 
pictures of symbols, impressive as they are, can alone suppress the 
influence of the political framing on public opinion.196 
VIII. COMPETING THEORIES 
No work to date has shown, based on empirical findings, the shift in 
the way the Court was presented to the public. Yet scholars, judges and 
journalists who have attempted to explain the sharp decline in the 
Court’s public support did offer explanations for the shift in the Court’s 
public image. In this section I examine three explanations of the shift in 
the Court’s public image in television coverage during the 1990s that 
offer paths that are different to my “change the medium theory.”  
  
 193. JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND 
CONFIRMATIONS 3 (2009). 
 194. Id. at 127. 
 195. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 357-58 & n. 245 (“[T]he relatively low media 
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1. Elite-based explanations are the most popular route taken to explain 
the rise of judicial power in Israel. According to this line of thinking, 
hegemonic elites that had experienced a decline in their electoral power 
attempted to secure their interests over the preferences of the multitude 
by empowering the counter-majoritarian judiciary.197 In line with this 
explanation, one may argue that rather than a change in the medium, the 
change in the coverage of the Court was a result of a change in the elites 
who controlled the media. According to this line of thinking, the elites 
who gave the Court its power had already shifted their position during 
the 1990s (and some argue even during the 1980s198) rather than after 
  
 197. See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 66, at 279-82 (arguing that the rise of power of 
the Court is part of an effort to preserve the hegemony of an elite that had lost its appeal 
to the electorate); HIRSCHL, supra note 12, at 50 (“[T]he process was steered by an ad hoc 
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case in which the SC overturned a decision by the AG to refrain from indicting Israel’s 
leading bankers, who had caused their banks to collapse through illegal manipulation of 
their stocks in the late 1970s and early 1980s . . . . Thus, the SC was seen as beginning to 
threaten the freedom of action enjoyed by the economic elite that was, at that time, 
closely related politically to Labor. Shortly before the 1992 elections, which Labor was 
expected to win, a liberal coalition in the Knesset, made up of members of Likud and 
Shinuy, a small liberal party, was able to affect the passage of the two human rights laws 
that constituted the ‘constitutional revolution.’” Id. 433. It should be noted that the 
authors’ historical claims contradict the works of Mandel, Mautner and Hirschl (among 
others) who view the rise of judicial power as an attempt of elites connected to the Labor 
party and the business community to fortify their power by empowering the judiciary. See 
supra note 197. Shinuy, the party most affiliated with the business elite continued 
throughout its existence to be the most avid supporter of the Court. Yet, the authors argue 
that this party cooperated with the Likud in order to enact the 1992 Basic Laws and give 
power to the Court against the will of the business community!  
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2005 as several scholars argue.199 Since the same elites controlled the 
media, the change in coverage was just another expression of this shift in 
the elites’ position.200  
There is no doubt that, unlike in the past, by the mid-1990s parts of 
the secular elites were no longer avid supporters of the Court. In this 
spirit, Moshe Gorali, the courts’ spokesperson between 1996 and 1999, 
claimed that “in terms of attacks on courts, the ‘taking off the gloves’ 
phase occurred with the election of Netanyahu to prime minister, through 
the axis of Netanyahu-Liberman and Hoter-Ishay.”201 Yet at least with 
regards to the media, scholars contest this line of thought and claim that 
journalists were still, at least in the years covered by this Article, part of 
the “old” guard that supported the Court.202 Moreover, a survey 
conducted in December 2004 among a representative sample of Israeli 
journalists showed a high level of trust in the Supreme Court, much 
higher than that of the general public.203 A study based on interviews 
with thirty-two journalists who covered the Court during the last decade 
also supports this conclusion. The study concludes that “the traditional 
view of the importance of an independent judiciary for achieving justice, 
and the perception of the basic validity of the law and trust of those who 
work in its service,” still have a strong hold among journalists.204 Hillel 
Sommer suggested (without systematic empirical evidence), that until 
2007 the media kept “Barak’s Court” protected with a “cotton wall . . .  
like a Citron.”205  
Sommer’s quotes of journalists admitting their favorable bias toward 
the Court until around 2007 may correctly describe their orientation, yet 
  
 199. See the text accompanying note 88. 
 200. Cf. ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE – THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 
9 (2003) (“Beyond that, the prestige of a judge depends on being thought well of in 
universities, law schools and the media, all bastions of the New Class.”). 
 201. Moshe Gorali, With One Hand Tied Behind the Back, GLOBES, Dec. 11, 2000, 
at 81 (Isr.). 
 202. PERI, supra note 8, at 13, 157, 251 (quoting columnist Nachum Barnea’s 
explanation that since the media was “the stronghold of the old guard,” Prime Minister 
Netanyahu’s idea to replace the old elites, made him the media’s enemy). 
 203. ASHER ARIAN, PAZIT BEN-NUN, SHLOMIT BARNEA, & YARIV TSFATIM, THE 
MEDIA AND ISRAELI DEMOCRACY: A VARIETY OF VANTAGE POINTS 13, 16-17 (2005) (Isr.). 
 204. Anat Peleg & Bryna Bogoch, Removing Justitia’s Blindfold: The 
Mediatization of Law in Israel, 34 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 961, 974 (2012). 
 205. Sommer, supra note 122, at 535-37. 
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certain biases of commercial media, its production values were stronger 
than any personal views of the reporters covering the Court.206 During the 
1990s it is unlikely that any journalist in Channel One wished to shatter 
the Court’s mythical image, yet this development was determined by the 
shift in the nature of the medium that dictated the message.207  
Take for example the Israeli media’s coverage of Israel’s relationship 
with Jordan after the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement. Journalists 
were extremely supportive of the peace agreement, yet media logic 
explains why, after the euphoria of the peace treaty passed, the media 
lost interest and barely covered the developing relationship between the 
two societies. Media coverage increased only in dramatic, isolated and 
particularly negative incidents. For example, when a Jordanian soldier 
killed seven schoolgirls who were visiting the border area on a school 
trip, all the news editions began with coverage of this deadly incident.208 
Similarly, following the entrance of the commercial channel, a change in 
the medium brought a different type of coverage for the Court, even 
though most journalists probably still had great confidence in it. The 
medium is indeed the message.  
2. Some scholars attribute the shift in the Court’s public image to the 
constitutional revolution’s shaky normative basis.209 As explained 
above,210 I am hesitant to adopt explanations that put too much emphasis 
on the constitutional revolution as a cause for the change in the way the 
Court was imagined. Writing in hindsight, scholars today view the 
normative problems they detect in the Court’s constitutional move as so 
evident that they attribute the change in public perception of the Court to 
these problems. But a change in the Court’s public image in television 
coverage is not necessarily the result of decisions that are normatively 
flawed. The assumption that normative problems that shout in a loud 
  
 206. See BOURDIEU, supra note 110, at 38 (“Television is a universe where you get 
the impression that social actors – even when they seem to be important, free, and 
independent… are puppets of a necessity that we must understand, of a structure that we 
must unearth and bring to light.”). 
 207. See id. at 45. 
 208. Gadi Wolfsfeld, Yoram Peri & Rami Khouri, News about the Other in Jordan 
and Israel: Does Peace Make a Difference?, 19 POL. COMM. 189, 206 (2002). 
 209. See, e.g., SAPIR, supra note 122, at 162-63 (connecting between the 
constitutional revolution, the loss of the Court’s image as a neutral institution and the 
decline in public support for the Court); Hofnung, supra note 36, at 36. 
 210. See the text accompanying notes 126-131. 
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voice at the scholar’s table will necessarily be translated immediately to 
a change in the public’s perceptions is unrealistic.211  
In public discourse the Court’s new authority to review legislation 
was not central during the first years following the constitutional 
revolution, if only for the reason that the Court rarely used it. Even when 
the Court did use this authority, the cases it chose were not at the center 
of the political debate.212 Indeed, criticism of the Court’s judicial review 
authority per-se is not very present in television coverage between 1993 
and 1996.  
3. The retired President of the Court, Dorit Beinisch, argued that the 
decline in public support for the Court was a result of Justice Minister 
Daniel Friedmann’s “unjustified” attacks on the Court between the years 
2007 and 2008. She added that parts of the media supported the attacks 
on the Court.213 Beinisch was highly critical of the media coverage of the 
Court, noting that the media covered the controversy between her and the 
Justice Minister Daniel Friedmann as if it were a telenovela.214 
According to this line of thought, the Court’s image in the media 
changed only following Friedmann’s attacks. Several journalists 
supported Beinisch’s claim and argued that, due to personal rivalries of 
certain journalists, some news organizations began a well-orchestrated 
campaign in favor of Friedmann and against the Court.215 Yet there is no 
way of getting around the fact that the decline in public support for the 
Court began at the beginning of the century,216 while Friedmann’s harsh 
  
 211. See Or Bassok, A Decade to the ‘Constitutional Revolution’: Israel’s 
Constitutional Process from a Historical-Comparative Perspective, 6 MISHPAT 
UMIMSHAL 451, 499-500 (2003) (Isr.) (predicting based on a comparative historical 
analysis that even though the Israeli Constitution was enacted in a flawed manner, it will 
gain public legitimacy in an evolutionary process). 
 212. See, e.g., RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 77, at 15 (noting that the Court 
has been restrained in constitutional issues and that it has refrained from striking down 
legislation almost completely besides in three cases (as was true for the beginning of 
2005)). 
 213. Dorit Beinisch, Address at the Beginning of the Year Ceremony at the IDC 
(Oct. 26, 2008) (Isr.). 
 214. Aviram Zino, Beinisch: One Can Think that I am a Telenovela Star, YNET, 
Nov. 23, 2007 (Isr.). 
 215. See Ehud Asheri, Behind the Lines/ Wholly Mozes, HAARETZ, Nov. 23, 2007 
(Isr.); Uzi Benziman, Yellowing the Grass, HAARETZ, June 12, 2007 (Isr.). 
 216. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 307 (surveying studies on the decline in public 
support). 
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critique began only in 2003, and he was appointed to the position of 
minister of justice only in 2007. Thus, Beinisch’s causal story cannot 
explain the change in the Court’s image in television coverage after 
1993. Nor can it explain the initial decline in public support for the Court 
at the beginning of this century. 
The mythical image did not completely disappear from the coverage 
of the Court between 1993 and 1996. And yet, as a result of the change 
in medium, items covering controversies over the selection of judges 
which in the past were unthinkable started appearing on the screen after 
1993. Coverage of politicians arguing that judges were pushing a 
political agenda signaled that the Court was no longer presented as 
distinct from the political arena. Television coverage no longer presented 
only items covering the Court as a professional, apolitical, consensual 
institution. The Court was not only covered much more extensively, but 
it was also presented in a more political fashion and its image of 
detachment from politics eroded significantly. Controversies on the 
Court’s decisions and authorities were presented on many occasions as 
personal conflicts between the Court’s president and politicians. The 
Court was no longer sacred in television coverage. Its coverage became 
more and more similar to the coverage of political institutions.  
Of course, without the Court’s involvement in the political arena as a 
result of changes in its adjudication that began during the 1980s, one can 
safely assume that the media would not have covered it to the same 
extent. Yet the change in the Court’s adjudication was not sufficient for 
the shattering of its mythical image. Indeed, the major shift in the Court’s 
adjudication occurred during the 1980s, while the media continued to 
portray the Court through a mythical prism.217 Only as a result of the 
entrance of commercial television did the prism through which the public 
view the Court in Channel One’s news edition changed significantly. 
This shift in the medium, rather than a change in the Court’s adjudication 
  
 217. Id. at 357-58 (“Television’s only channel, for twenty-five years continued to 
portray the Court in mythical terms.”). The Court’s deficient “strategic behavior” in some 
of its decisions may have also contributed to the shift in the Court’s public image. See 
SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS 163-212 (2014) (analyzing the Court’s 
strategic behavior and the executive branch’s response to its decisions in view of the 
decline of public support for the Court). The question of whether the judges’ deficient 
strategic behavior was a result of their difficulty in adjusting to the new media reality is a 
complicated one and is beyond the scope of this Article. 
102 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.1  
or in journalists’ disposition toward the Court, shattered the mythical 
image of the Court.  
CONCLUSION  
The existence of high levels of public support for national high courts 
in many countries worldwide is a perplexing phenomenon.218 According 
to current prevailing comparative theories, the worldwide phenomenon 
of judicial empowerment in various countries is the work of political, 
economic, and judicial elites securing their interests over the preferences 
of the multitude.219 Yet if national high courts act in the name of elites 
“insulating policy making in general, and their policy preferences in 
particular, from the vicissitudes of democratic politics,”220 how is it that 
these courts have received high public support in opinion polls over a 
long period of time?221  
Israel has served for many years as “exhibit A” in these accounts of 
the rise of judicial power.222 Until the new millennium the rise in the 
Israeli Supreme Court’s power was not followed by any loss in its public 
support. The sharp decline in the Court’s public support during the 
beginning of the 21st century is thus an important development.223  
  
 218. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 376-80 (presenting the puzzle). 
 219. See HIRSCHL, supra note 12, at 11-12, 16, 37-40, 43-44, 47-49, 98-99, 169-
72, 199, 210-18 (analyzing elites seeking to insulate their policy preferences from the 
vicissitudes of democratic politics); See BORK, supra note 200, at 1, 8-9; TOM GINSBURG, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 18, 24-26, 30-33 (2003) (arguing that judicial 
review in new democracies is created by political elites that at the time democratization 
occurs foresee themselves losing in elections and thus seek to entrench judicial review as 
a form of “political insurance”); Rogers M. Smith, Judicial Power and Democracy: A 
Machiavellian View, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 199, 
204-07 (Steven Kautz et al. eds., 2009) (“Powerful judiciaries are at bottom not partners 
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 220. HIRSCHL, supra note 12, at 11-12. 
 221. Bassok, supra note 2, at 377-80 (“If these courts have been preserving the 
interests of elites whose public support is eroding, if ‘an activist judiciary helps to 
advance the ends that democratic branches of government would never sanction,’ how do 
these courts succeed in preserving their public support over a long period of time?”). 
 222. See, e.g., Hirschl, supra note 11, at 476 (“Israel is arguably one of the world’s 
prime examples of a fully-fledged juristocracy.”). 
 223. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 306-07. 
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The primary mechanism linking the general public and courts has 
been the mass media, and in particular, television.224 Much has been 
written on mass media’s power (especially television’s power) to shape 
the public’s perception of social reality and to serve as “the common 
storyteller of our age.”225 In the American context, scholars agree that the 
public’s beliefs concerning the Supreme Court and support for it are 
closely related to the way in which the media covers the Court.226 It 
seems reasonable to conclude that public support for the Israeli Court is 
also dependent, to a large extent, on the construction of the Court’s 
image in media coverage.227 Since the sociological legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court in Israel was based on its mythical image,228 the 
shattering of this image in television coverage after the entrance of the 
commercial channel may have significantly contributed to the erosion of 
the Court’s public support. This conclusion corresponds well with a 
contested theory in American media scholarship known as 
“videomalaise.” According to this theory there is a connection between 
reliance on television journalism and public mistrust of governmental 
institutions.229 Indeed, commercial media that is biased toward 
sensationalist coverage has negative consequences on the public’s 
perceptions and assessments of the American Supreme Court.230  
  
 224. See id. at 312-13. 
 225. MOY & PFAU, supra note 43, at 45, 86; see also NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE 
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 227. See Bassok, supra note 2, at 312-16. 
 228. See Barzilai, supra note 20, at 21, 25-26, 30; Barzilai, supra note 21, at 790. 
 229. See MOY & PFAU, supra note 43, at xiv, 70, 117-23 (“[N]etwork news 
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 230. See Johnston & Bartels, supra note 62, at 262-63, 273 (“[W]e find that higher 
levels of exposure to sensationalist relative to sober media sources predict more negative 
attitudes toward the Court.”). 
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Understanding the relationship between public support and the 
Court’s work is not merely a question of whether the Court’s work can 
be justified in theoretical-normative terms. The manner in which scholars 
imagine the Court and justify its authority does not always correspond to 
the common perception of the Court or the manner in which the public 
justifies its authority.231 As Lawrence Friedman explained, “the public 
learns its law from the evening news, in tiny bites that convey upshots, 
not theories, results, not reasoning. The jurists and system-makers are 
talking only to each other.”232 
In order to understand the decline in public support for judicial power 
in Israel, one needs to examine not merely flaws in the justifications for 
the Court’s newly acquired power of judicial review, but also the 
portrayal of the Court in the media.  
By the end of 1996 the Court’s mythical image was partly shattered. It 
was shattered not in the sense that remnants of this image disappeared 
completely from media coverage and public discourse. Indeed, the 
mythical image continues to influence coverage even today. But it was 
shattered in the sense that – even in television coverage that cannot 
afford too much time for reflective thinking and thus for avant-garde 
thoughts233 – ideas such as the political nature of the Court became 
clichés. Thus, when President Barak objected in 2005 to the appointment 
of Ruth Gavison to the Court because she has an “agenda,”234 his 
argument was fiercely rejected in public discourse, even by those who 
objected to Gavison’s appointment to the Court.235 It was rejected not 
because people argued that Gavison lacked such an agenda, but because 
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they claimed that Barak also had an agenda. Two decades earlier, at a 
time when the Court’s mythical image controlled the imagination of 
Israelis, acknowledging that a candidate had a political agenda would 
have disqualified her candidacy to an apolitical Court. Indeed, the 
mythical image was so strong that in 1983, before its collapse, a judge 
was framed in coverage as apolitical even while he ran for presidency as 
a candidate of the Likud party.236 But in 2005, after the shattering of the 
mythical image, it was no longer possible to express in public discourse 
the idea that the Court was a “neutral” or “apolitical” institution without 
being laughed at.  
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